

# Angola 2000/2001

## Key Development Issues and the Role of NGOs

Inge Tvedten

R 2001: 1



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**Chr. Michelsen Institute** *Development Studies and Human Rights*

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# Contents

1	INTRODUCTION	1
2	POVERTY AND DESPAIR IN THE MIDST OF PLENTY	3
2.1	URBANISATION	5
2.2	HIV/AIDS	7
3.	ANGOLA'S IRREGULAR ECONOMY	10
3.1	ECONOMIC REFORMS	10
3.2	THE OIL INDUSTRY	12
4.	ANGOLA'S POLITICS OF DISORDER	16
4.1	RETURN TO LUSAKA OR DIALOGUE?	17
4.2	SOCIAL RENUNCIATION	18
5.	DEVELOPMENT AID AND SOCIAL FUNDS	20
5.1	NORWEGIAN DEVELOPMENT AID	22
6.	THE STATUS AND ROLE OF NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL NGOS	26
6.1	SOME CONCEPTUAL CLARIFICATIONS	27
6.2	A BRIEF HISTORICAL OVERVIEW	28
6.3	POLITICAL SPACE AND LEGAL CONTEXT	31
6.5	NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL NGOS	33
	6.5.1 <i>National NGOs</i>	34
	6.5.2 <i>International NGOs</i>	37
6.6	BUILDING COMPETENCE AND CAPACITY	39
6.7	NORWEGIAN NGOS AND NGO SUPPORT	40
7.	CONCLUSIONS	46
8.	REFERENCES	48
8.1	REFERENCES AND SELECTED LITERATURE ON ANGOLA	48
8.2	WEB SITES ON ANGOLA	55
8.3	GENERAL REFERENCES	55
ANNEX 1: LIST OF PERSONS MET		
ANNEX 2: TERMS OF REFERENCE COUNTRY REPORT, PART I		
ANNEX 3: TERMS OF REFERENCE: COUNTRY REPORT ANGOLA 2000/2001, PART II		
ANNEX 4: LAW OF ASSOCIATIONS (91/14)		
ANNEX 5: LIST OF NATIONAL NGOS		
ANNEX 6: LIST OF INTERNATIONAL NGOS		

# 1 Introduction

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The following is the second report on Angola under the Country Advisor Agreement between the Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation (NORAD), and Chr. Michelsen Institute (CMI) and Nordic Consulting group (NCG). In line with the original contract and Terms of Reference (see Appendix 2) the report consists of a Part I synthesising and assessing existing information regarding economic, political and social developments in Angola, and a Part II focussing on topics of relevance for Norwegian development aid to be specified by NORAD. The primary purpose of the reports has been defined as being a point of reference for internal discussions in MFA/NORAD, but they are also made available to other institutions and individuals working with Angola through the CMI Report Series.

Part I has, in accordance with the ToR, been kept relatively brief. Chapter 2 (“Poverty and Despair in the Midst of Plenty”) will give special emphasis to the implications of Angola’s excessive urbanisation and HIV/AIDS; Chapter 3 (“Angola’s Irregular Economy”) will give special emphasis to the current economic reform and the government’s increasing confidence as an actor in the oil industry; Chapter 4 (“Angola’s Politics of Disorder”) will give special emphasis to political alternatives for peace and the government’s apparent social renunciation; and in Chapter 5 we will discuss development aid to Angola, including the corporate social initiatives of the oil industry.

Part II of the study takes a closer look at the role of national and international NGOs in Angola (see Appendix 3). The number of NGOs active in the country has increased substantially since the introduction of the new democratic constitution in 1991, with the current number of registered national NGOs being 395 and international NGOs being 95. Since May 1991 the activities of the NGOs have been regulated by the Law of Associations (*Lei de Associação, 14/91*). The immediate reason for NORAD’s wish to focus on NGOs is a new law on NGOs (*Aprova o Código das Organizações Não Governamentais*) that has been in the making since 1996 and was expected to pass the Council of Ministers towards the end of 2000. As it turned out, the Law was stopped at the last minute by the Council itself, but the issue of the status and role of NGOs in Angola is still highly relevant given their dominant position in current developments.

As part of its responsibility as country advisor on Angola, CMI has developed an Angola web page ([www.cmi.no](http://www.cmi.no)). The page includes i) a presentation of CMI as a resource institution on Angola; ii) a list of institutions working with Angola in Norway; iii) internet links to relevant web pages dealing with Angola; and iv) a selected and updated list of literature on Angola.

CMI is increasingly involved in Angola, and intends to enhance its involvement in the years to come. To facilitate this, Chr. Michelsen Institute has entered into an Agreement of Cooperation with the *Angola-Instituto de Pesquisa Social e*

*Económica* (AIP). CMI personnel have also taken an active part in several consultancy projects in Angola, as well as in the public debate on Angola in Norway, particularly where related to Norwegian petroleum investments (CMI 2001).

Fieldwork for this study was carried out in the period between 8-18 January 2001. We would like to thank the staff at the Norwegian Embassy in Luanda for their excellent support and willingness to share points of view during the fieldwork period. Having said this, the analysis and assessments made are those of the consultant and do not necessarily reflect the opinions of MFA/NORAD.

## 2 Poverty and Despair in the Midst of Plenty

As indicated in Table 1, Angola is a country characterised by extreme poverty and despair, despite a large economic potential. As opposed to practically all other countries in sub-Saharan Africa, moreover, most indicators have shown a negative trend the past years. This is perhaps best illustrated by the persistent drop in Angola's Human Development Index ranking in recent years, despite increasing income from oil and diamonds.<sup>1</sup> In 2000, Angola ranked 160 out of 174 countries in terms of human development. Perhaps the most dramatic expression of the severe socio-economic situation is the child mortality rate, which implies that 292 out of 1000 children die before they are five years old, and the low rate of enrolment in primary education, which implies a problematic future for the large majority of those surviving their first five years. UNICEF has recently declared Angola, together with Sierra Leone, as the worst country in the world for children to grow up in (UNICEF 2000).

**Table 1:** *Basic Social Indicators*

INDICATOR	VALUE
GDP per capita (USD)	438
Life expectancy at birth (years)	42
Infant mortality rate (per 1,000 live births)	170
Child mortality rate (per 1,000 live births)	292
Children 1 year vaccinated (%)	17
Infants with low birth weight, < 2.5 kg (%)	18
Children under 5 with malnutrition (stunted, %)	53
Population with access to safe water (%)	31
Population with access to adequate sanitation (%)	40
Net enrolment in basic education (%)	29
Pupils reaching fifth grade (%)	30
Adult literacy rate (men/women) (%)	30/50
HDI ranking (out of 174 countries)	160

Source: (Hodges 2001)

The extreme poverty in a rich country like Angola has long-term and complex causes. 450 years of colonial rule under the Portuguese effectively segregated the country in terms of race, class and regional idiosyncrasies. A centralised political system after Independence in 1975 led to improved social conditions in terms of education and health, but without creating the necessary economic base for development. And the liberalisation of the Angolan economy since the

<sup>1</sup> The Human Development Index is a composite index based on three indicators: longevity, as measured by life expectancy at birth; educational attainment, as measured by adult literacy and combined primary, secondary and tertiary enrolment ratios; and standard of living, as measured by real GDP per capita in US dollars in purchasing power parity terms.



early 1990s has increasingly detached a small economic elite from the large majority of the Angolan population (Tvedten 1997; Hodges 2001).

Throughout Angolan history, war has had a negative impact on social processes and conditions. Several hundred thousand people have died as a direct result of the war only since 1992, and any development effort have been hampered by the problematic security situation in the country. At the start of 2001 there were 3.8 million internally displaced persons, representing close to 30 percent of the population. 457,000 of these had fled their homes during the year 2000 (APM 2001). Although the war cannot alone explain the desperate situation in which the large majority of Angolans find themselves, it has had a tremendous impact on Angolan society.

The situation of extreme poverty and despair is currently maintained by a complex set of factors ranging from political mismanagement and corruption, via inherent problems in economies depending heavily on natural resources (the “Dutch Disease”), to the low level of education in the country at large as well as in the public sector (Tvedten 2000). While some commentators emphasise signs of improvements in the living conditions of the Angolan population with the current situation of relative peace (see below), others argue that there in fact are no such signs (see Box 1).

#### Box 1

*“The Angolan government claims that the situation in the country is returning to normal, but this is a far cry from the reality witnessed by the MSF-teams working in nine provinces throughout the country. In this new phase of the conflict, the population has been increasingly subjected to the violence of war, abused, displaced and relocated according to military strategies and political interests, exposed to epidemics and malnutrition”.*

*“It is not just the Angolan government that is speaking of “normalisation” in the country. The international community and the United Nations echo this talk of new-found stability. The World Food Programme (WFP) for example, is planning to redefine the beneficiaries of its general food distribution, limiting recipients to those displaced persons who accept relocation by the government. Support from the international community in the form of substantial economic investments, whose impact is only visible in Luanda and on the Atlantic coast, make this facade of stability possible”.*

*Source: (MSF 2000)*

In any case, recent politico-military developments do make the current situation particularly crucial for Angola. For the first time in decades there are options for constructive policies and interventions, which puts a particularly heavy responsibility on the Angolan government. Large parts of the country are still marked by insecurity, but the situation has improved considerably since the government’s military offensive in December 1999 and the subsequent removal of UNITA from important strongholds throughout the country.

As argued in the previous report (Tvedten 2000), moreover, the history of Western involvement in the Angolan conflict during the Cold War, and the grossly inadequate resources allocated through the United Nations during the crucial transitional period towards peace and democracy in the early 1990s,<sup>2</sup> also place a heavy responsibility on the international community to contribute to a positive development.

Within the complex set of causes behind the severe socio-economic conditions in Angola, two issues will be treated in more detail here. One is the excessive rate of urbanisation, which has severe implications both for the national economy and for social organisation and cultural perceptions. The second is the issue of HIV/AIDS, which is serious but still not really acknowledged as such by the Angolan government and in Angolan society.

## 2.1 Urbanisation

More than 50 percent of Angola's population of 12-13 million people currently live in cities and towns, as a result of a combination of push factors (war in rural areas, lack of access to means of agricultural production etc.) and pull factors (improved personal security, perceived better access to employment and income etc.). An estimated 3.5 million people live in the capital city Luanda alone, which is more than twice as many as in 1990 (Hodges 2001). No other country in sub-Saharan Africa has such a large proportion of its population in the capital city. Other regional centres have also experienced rapid population growth, including Huambo, Benguela, Malange, Kuito and Lubango.

### BOX 2

- *There is an unequivocal correlation between urbanisation and economic development and growth*
- *Urban areas play a significant role in the democratisation process, through political mobilisation as well as local government;;*
- *There is a close link between urban and rural development, both in macro-economic terms and through migration and urban-rural links.*
- *The proportion of women in migration flows to cities is increasing, and the urbanisation process impacts significantly on the status and roles of women;*
- *The environmental problems facing developing countries are increasingly associated with cities and urban centres;*
- *Poverty is increasingly an attribute of urbanisation, and urban poverty exhibits specific features which needs to be understood better.*

Source: Kamete, Tostensen and Tvedten 2001

<sup>2</sup> Many will argue that the UN involvement in peace and reconstruction in Angola has generally been nothing but unsuccessful. The first UN Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM I) arrived in 1989 to verify the withdrawal of Cuban troops. UNAVEM II followed the Bicesse Accords of 1991 to monitor demobilisation and disarmament, and was replaced in 1995 by UNAVEM III to assist implementation of the Lusaka Protocol. This was downgraded in June 1997 to the UN Observer Mission in Angola (MONUA), which formally ended its mission in March 1999 after the Lusaka Process collapsed amid MPLA accusations that the UN presence had provided a cover for UNITA to once again rearm during the cease-fire.

The urbanisation process is part of a general trend in Africa, where more than half the population will live in cities and towns by 2010 (Kamete, Tostensen and Tvedten 2001). Generally such processes are seen to have both positive and negative implications for development (see Box 2).

Urbanisation in Angola represents a special case in that it has been extremely rapid and has taken place under very special circumstances. First of all it has implied profound changes in class and ethnic relations. People from the main ethnic groups, who traditionally have lived in different regions, now live next door to each other. And the poor majority daily witness the affluence of the economic elite in their lavish cars and houses frequenting expensive shops and restaurants.<sup>3</sup> Although studies of urban change are scarce (see van der Winden 1997, de Sousa 1998, Robson 2001), there are indications that this situation has created serious social and political tension in many urban areas.

There are also indications that the process of urbanisation has led to a fragmentation of social groups and networks such as the household, the extended family, neighbourhoods and local associations (Robson 2001). This has, in case, severely weakened the social capital of the poor. However, there are also studies indicating that new strong networks have been created, e.g. among women (van der Winden 1997).

Urban areas in Angola are further characterised by a near complete breakdown of public institutions and services, very low levels of formal employment, lack of access to proper dwellings, water, electricity and sewerage, and severe problems of social unrest and violence. In fact, poor housing and physical infrastructure seems to contribute significantly to the high rates of illness and death in urban slum areas (UNDP 2000). Underlining this is the fact that such a basic necessity as water (transported from rivers outside Luanda on trucks and sold in small quantities to urban residents) is a major expense for poor households.

For the large majority of urban Angolans, the informal economy is the dominant source of employment and income as well as goods and services. Even though the informal economy in Angola has rightly been portrayed as a vibrant sector giving hope for future economic development, it is saturated and yields very limited returns for the large majority of its participants. It is also dominated by trade and service delivery, with very few productive enterprises (de Sousa 1998).

One characteristic that makes the situation for the urban population in Angola particularly severe is the difficulty of establishing and maintaining links with the rural areas. Rural-urban relations are an important part of the coping strategies in most other urban settings in sub-Saharan Africa. Limited exchanges of goods and services make the urban population dependent on expensive urban commodities, including foodstuffs. In other countries in the region, rural-urban

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<sup>3</sup> The richest stratum are collectively dubbed by many Angolans as “the 100 families” consisting of the “old creoles” and the “new creoles” (Hodges 2001:37).

links are also actively used to relieve social pressures, e.g. by sending urban children to rural areas for education and by accommodating rural youngsters seeking employment in town.

Table 2 contains some socio-economic indicators broken down for rural and urban areas respectively. These demonstrate that the differences in HDI are principally attributable to disparities of income and consumption, whereas the distribution with respect to life expectancy and literacy is more even between urban and rural areas. This shows that poverty and vulnerability in the urban areas is severe, despite generally higher cash incomes.

**Table 2.** *Urban-rural Discrepancies in Human Development.*

INDICATOR	URBAN	RURAL
Income	535 (USD)	83 (USD)
Life expectancy at birth	42.0	42.0
Illiteracy rate	42.1	56.7
HDI	0.41	0.26

Source: UNDP 2000

An improvement in living conditions for the majority of Angolans will depend on an alleviation of the pressure in urban areas, and a return to the countryside of large parts of the most able-bodied population in order to recapture Angola's vast agricultural potential. Having said this, experience from urbanisation processes in other countries in the region (and decades of international development aid aimed at turning the "urban bias") clearly indicate that people having moved to town are not likely to move back to the rural areas. It remains to be seen whether Angola's special situation, with the combination of an extreme urban poverty and a vast and under-utilised agricultural potential, will make the country a special case in this respect.

## 2.2 HIV/AIDS

The HIV/AIDS epidemic will have a tremendous impact in urban as well as in rural areas in Angola. The adult prevalence rate of HIV/AIDS is currently estimated by UNAIDS at 2.78 percent (UNAIDS 2000), with national estimates being 3.5 percent (UNICEF 2001). In accordance with the latter more than 200,000 adults are expected to become seropositive in the near future (United Nations 2001:11).

The HIV/AIDS prevalence in Angola is very low compared to other countries in the region (see Table 3), and it is uncertain whether this reflects the real situation or is the outcome of limited political attention and a poor health system not capturing the incidence of the fatal disease. In fact, the region of Southern Africa continues to bear the brunt of the global epidemic. Nine of the twelve most affected countries in the world are found in Southern Africa (the other three are in East Africa). While some East African countries are beginning to report declining rates of prevalence and positive changes in sexual behaviour

among youth, the epidemic in Southern Africa has yet to show signs of abating (UNAIDS 2000).

**Table 3.** *Estimated Proportion and Number of People Living With HIV/AIDS, 2000*

COUNTRY	HIV/AIDS RATE	HIV/AIDS NUMBER
Angola	2.78	15,000
Botswana	35.80	24,000
Congo	6.43	8,600
DRC	5.07	95,000
Lesotho	23.57	16,000
Malawi	15.96	70,000
Mozambique	13.22	98,000
Namibia	19.54	18,000
South Africa	19.94	250,000
Swaziland	25.25	7,100
Tanzania	8.09	140,000
Zambia	19.95	99,000
Zimbabwe	25.06	160,000

Source: UNAIDS 2000

Looking more closely at Angola, the National Aids Programme estimated in 1999 that 3.4 percent of the adult population (15-49 years) were infected by HIV/AIDS compared with 1.06 percent in 1993 (Gilbert 1999). The report outlines two scenarios. In Scenario 1 it is assumed that peace is established and the government commitment and efforts to struggle against the propagation of the HIV epidemic are efficient and generate good results. The prevalence is then expected to reach 6.39 percent (or 620.380 directly affected) in 2009. In Scenario 2, it is assumed that the government commitment and efforts are not sufficient and that the war continues. This scenario implies that the prevalence will increase rapidly to 10.05 percent (or 970.150 directly affected) in 2009.

In fact, Angola has not seen the kind of concerted efforts related to HIV/AIDS as found, for example, in Namibia (UNDP 1997). This is partly related to the overwhelming nature of other health problems that Angola faces,<sup>4</sup> but the Government has also under-communicated the seriousness of the epidemic. An Angolan Aids Commission (CNLS) and a Technical Commission for Aids (CNTS) were created in December 1997, but have not functioned constructively. There are a number of initiatives by NGOs, UN agencies, bilateral donors, private enterprises, churches and foundations, but a social and economic problem of the scale and seriousness of HIV/AIDS makes a concerted national effort necessary.

<sup>4</sup> The main causes of death among children are malaria (38 percent), acute diarrhoea diseases (14 percent) and measles (10 percent).

The considerably higher prevalence of HIV/AIDS in neighbouring countries and the weakness of the statistical base (only nine provinces out of 18 have the capacity to carry out HIV tests, and in those that can the capacity is very limited) make it likely that the estimates given above are conservative. There does not, in fact, seem to be any compelling reason why transmission should be less frequent in Angola than in other countries in the region. Some argue that Angola is different due to the strong position of the Catholic Church, and that the country has remained relatively isolated from the rest of the region due to the continuous war situation. In fact, most of the commonly cited reasons for the spread of the disease (social disintegration, changing sexual behaviour among youngsters, limited access to and utilisation of contraceptives etc.) are present in Angola, and relations with countries like Namibia and Zambia where the disease is very prevalent have been extensive and increasing for many years.

Even with the conservative estimates, however, the impact of the HIV/AIDS epidemic will be substantial. This is underlined by the fact that South Africa, with a current HIV/AIDS rate of 20 percent, had a rate that was lower than Angola's only ten years ago. In addition to the social implications at the level of the families and individuals directly affected, it will also have macro-economic consequences which will make economic recovery in Angola even more difficult: rising social costs, lower consumption and saving, reduction in agricultural capacity, rising costs of industrial production, lower surpluses in the private sector etc. (DANIDA 2000:20). African countries where less than 5 percent of the population are affected are currently experiencing a modest impact on their GDP growth rates. As the HIV prevalence rate rises to 20 percent or more, however, GDP growth rates may decline up to 2 percent per year (UNAIDS 2000).<sup>5</sup>

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<sup>5</sup> See UNDP 1998 for a thorough assessment of the social and economic impact of the HIV/AIDS epidemic in Namibia (UNDP 1998)

### 3. Angola's Irregular Economy

Angola has huge oil resources and an even larger potential, and is currently considered to be the most promising oil production area in the world (EIU 2001). Production has increased from 690,000 b/d in 1996 to 850,000 b/d in 2000, with an estimated production of 1.5 mn b/d in 2004 (The Economist, 5 October 2000). Despite this, the country suffers from a large current account deficit, an equally large public sector deficit, high inflation rates, and a huge foreign debt. Other sectors in the economy, with the exception of the diamond sector and an emerging Luanda-based construction sector, have been at a virtual standstill for years with few if any signs of improvement. Key economic indicators are given in Table 4.

The past year has been dominated by two interrelated developments. One is the introduction of an economic reform programme, in which the vested interests both of the Angolan government and of key international actors, including the IMF, seem to be stronger than under previous programmes. A second is the increasing confidence of the government vis-à-vis the oil sector, as evidenced by their controversial plan to restrict the rate of growth in oil production and their demand for increasing signature bonuses from international oil companies.

**Table 4:** *Key Economic Indicators*

INDICATOR	1998	1999	2000
Gross Domestic Product (USD bn)	4.5	5.0	4.9
Real GDP Growth (%)	3.2	2.7	4.9
Consumer price inflation (%)	107.3	248.2	316.0
Trade balance (USD mn)	1,464	2,683	5,500
Current account balance (USD mn)	-1,005	-727	-100
Foreign exchange reserves (USD mn)	203.5	496.1	401.0
Total external debt (USD bn)	12.2	11.9	11.5
Debt service ratio (%)	36.6	18.2	13.6

Source: EIU (2000)

The reform programme and the oil sector are interlinked through the unlikely bedfellows of the International Monetary Fund and Human Rights Organisations (such as Global Witness), and their efforts to enforce larger transparency in the oil economy both from the government and from the international oil companies.

#### 3.1 Economic Reforms

During the past 13 years, there have been no less than nine different economic reform programmes in Angola, some lasting barely a year and in one case only a few weeks. Seven of these have been described as broadly reformist in nature,

and two as clearly anti-reformist, reversing previously implemented reforms (Hodges 2001:102). Assessments of the evolution of some of these programmes shows a pattern in which an initial burst of reforming energy has resulted in the partial implementation of the proposed measures, usually without adequate policy co-ordination, followed by setbacks often resulting from the lack of consistency in the measures, political interventions from above to halt the reforms, and then a period of drift or partial reversal of the reforms.

Following years of failure, a new economic team was appointed in 1999, including the Central Bank Governor Aguiñaldo Jaime and the Minister of Finance Joaquim David, that was given greater authority to run economic policy. With reference to policy statements by and confidence in the new economic team, the IMF signed a long-anticipated nine-month Staff-Monitored Programme with the Government in April 2000. Key aspects of the programme are to establish macro-economic stability, promote poverty reduction and dismantle the state controls and distortions that have enabled widespread corruption and inefficiency.<sup>6</sup>

In a mid-term review carried out in October 2000, it was concluded that the Angolan government had initiated several structural reforms, even though there were still few concrete results. Among the reforms were a diagnostic study of the oil sector, to be done by the international consulting company KPMG, that has been contracted for a period of 30 months. The goal is to improve transparency and create management capacity that permits a continuous monitoring of the income from oil. The IMF has been less pleased with the cooperation of the international oil companies in enhancing transparency, a situation which now seems to be changing due to strong external pressure (see below).

Less had been done with poverty alleviation and social policy. The Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper, currently an important feature of the IMF's programmes in most developing countries, had not really been initiated except for the establishment of certain inter-ministerial working groups. As appears from Table 5, the allocation of economic resources to social sectors remains very low with no clear indications of improvement at the time of writing in early 2001.<sup>7</sup>

Despite the slow pace of progress, the IMF and the Angolan Government are likely to reach an agreement. The deadline for the I-PRSP has been set to April 2001, and for the entire IMF Staff Monitored Programme to June 2001. With such an agreement, a continuation of the reform in the form of a "Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility Program" (PRGF) is likely. Equally important for the Angolan government is that an agreement will open the way for renegotiations of the terms for the country's large foreign debt. As regards the

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<sup>6</sup> Mr. David was replaced as Minister of Finance by Julio Bassa at the initiation of the reform programme.

<sup>7</sup> If enhanced allocations to social sectors do take place, commentators warn that this should be assessed over time to mitigate against a merely temporary shift in response to adhere to expectations from IMF and other pressure groups.



IMF, a number of key member countries with vested interests in Angola are interested in an IMF-monitored programme in order to enhance the country's international legitimacy.

**Table 5:** *Government Expenditure by Function (% of total expenditures)*

TYPE OF EXPENDITURE	1997	1998	1999
General public services	17.8	18.3	16.1
Defence and public order	40.0	27.2	41.0
Peace process	0.6	0.0	0.1
Education	5.0	6.2	4.8
Health	3.1	3.3	2.8
Economic affairs and services	18.7	13.4	10.3
Interest (commitments basis)	10.0	16.6	10.7
Other (recorded but unclassified)	- 0.5	12.6	12.4

Source: IMF (2000)

## 3.2 The Oil Industry

Oil is still alfa and omega in the Angolan economy, representing 61.4 percent of GDP and 88 percent of exports in 1999 (EIU 2001).<sup>8</sup> Total production in 2000 was 850,000 b/d. This makes Angola the second largest producer of oil in Africa, after Nigeria. Angola is expected to become the largest producer in Africa by 2005, with a total production of 1.3 mn b/d. The country will receive USD 3.5 bn of investment from the international oil industry each year for the next ten years.<sup>9</sup>

At the same time, a substantial proportion of the oil revenue (estimated at 40 percent by the IMF) never finds its way into the state budgets. The net foreign exchange revenue averaged USD 2.2 bn a year between 1996 and 1999. Through various mechanisms, large sums of money bypass the Treasury and are used for direct payments to cover the costs of the war with UNITA, debt servicing of poor loans at high interest rates, and (according to Global Witness and other observers) high-level corruption. Little has, in other words, so far found its way to the development of Angolan society.

The discovery by Elf Aquitaine of the deepwater Girassol field in 1996 marked the start of a new era in Angolan oil exploration. Over 20 major discoveries since then have added over 8 bn barrels of recoverable oil reserves to the 3.3 bn

<sup>8</sup> Official diamond exports represented 11 percent, which is sharply higher than in previous years.

<sup>9</sup> According the Economist Intelligence Unit (2000), the Angolan authorities forecast investments of between USD 4-5 bn per year in the period 2000-2003..

barrels estimated in 1996 (EIU 2000).<sup>10</sup> By mid-2000, 21 exploration licences for blocks had been awarded.

Originally, foreign companies became contractors to the state oil company Sonangol through Production Sharing Agreements, where the former financed investment costs in full and both shared the excess “profit oil” on a sliding scale linked to cumulative production. In the late 1990s, however, the Government increasingly sought non-recoverable down payments in the form of so-called “signature bonuses” on oil contracts. An estimated USD 300 mn was reaped from each of the highly promising ultra-deep blocks 31-33 in 1999.<sup>11</sup> Another sign of the increasing confidence of the government and Sonangol is recent policy statements to the effect of slowing down the rate of increase in oil production in order to conserve resources.

The most important international oil companies in Angola in terms of share of production are Chevron, TotalFina-Elf and BP-Amoco. The Norwegian companies Norsk Hydro (Blocks 5, 9, 17 and 34) and Statoil (Blocks 15, 17 and 31) are also involved, and will invest NOK 3-5 bn per year in the country over the coming five to ten years. Block 34 is the fourth and last ultra deep block on offer for some time to come. The licence is to be operated by Sonangol, in partnership with Norsk Hydro as technical advisor. Hydro and Sonangol have shares of 30 and 20 percent respectively.<sup>12</sup> All the big oil companies are currently scrambling for the remaining 50 percent of the block.

In addition to the Norwegian oil companies, Norwegian service and supply companies such as FMC-Kongsberg Offshore, Kværner Oil and Gas, Aker Maritime, Petroleum Geo Services, Fred Olsen Production and Stolt Offshore are also involved in the Angolan oil sector. Stolt Offshore has recently become one of the major actors in oil industry supplies in the country. The central role of the relatively small Norwegian oil companies in Angola has received international attention (see Box 3).

Oil companies have recently been under considerable pressure to contribute to more transparency both by the International Monetary Fund, and by influential NGOs (such as Global Witness) and Angolan interest groups.<sup>13</sup> An example of the latter is the small political party PADRA, which recently distributed

<sup>10</sup> Globally, companies hope to strike oil with four of every ten exploration wells drilled. In Angola's deep-sea blocks 14, 15, 17 and 18, that strike rate has been almost ten out of ten (The Economist, 8 June 2000).

<sup>11</sup> Signature payments are distributed among the oil companies in accordance with their share in the relevant block. In line with this, Statoil paid NOK 452 mn for their 13,33% share in Block 31.

<sup>12</sup> The technical challenge in Block 34 is no small deal. Technology does not yet exist to produce oil from under 2,500 metres of water (the world's deepest significant sub-sea oil production is currently in the Gulf of Mexico, at water depths of 1,200 metres) (The Economist, 8 June 2000).

<sup>13</sup> In a recent development, a UN Under-secretary-general for Africa has also asked the oil companies to be “allies in the peace process” by using their influence with the Angolan government to help peace initiatives (EIU 2001:23). As argued elsewhere (Nordås, Tvedten and Wiig 2000), care should be taken in involving companies with vested economic interests and no particular competence in issues of development and human rights in such matters.

pamphlets and went on hunger strike to draw attention to the government's role in the Elf scandal and charged that it is deliberately prolonging the war in order to pillage the country's rich natural resources (The Economist, 28 February 2001).

### Box 3

*[Norway, which has had an energy cooperation agreement with Angola since 1987 and shares with it massive oil production rates compared to population, has been very influential. Norway's advice covers three areas]:*

*"Firstly, long-term management of oil reserves is a priority under a new bilateral agreement signed in August [2000] with Norway's Petroleum Directorate, which has helped improve management and draw up new regulations. This has influenced the slow-down [on the development of offshore oilfields] and follows three ministerial level visits to Angola in the last three years.*

*Secondly, oil minister Botelho de Vasconcelos says that Angola will follow Norway in keeping close to, but apart from, OPEC, giving Luanda the freedom to choose when to cut production in support of higher oil prices.*

*Thirdly, Angola is pressuring oil companies to use Sonangol joint ventures as contractors, again copying Norway for building a local oil industry from scratch. Major companies prefer to choose their contractors on the open market, but Angolan officials insist this is the only way to build a local industry.*

*Backed by the Norwegian government-industry association INTSOK, Norwegian companies [] have won contracts in Angola. Norway is also advising on the crippling "Dutch Disease" which can inflict mineral-rich countries when a surge of money into state accounts can destroy a non-oil industrial base and worsen mis-management. Norway has established an "oil-fund" to avoid this and to manage fluctuations in the world price. This will, however, be difficult in Angola where billions of dollars of oil revenue have been diverted into unorthodox financing schemes and massive arms purchases".*

*Source: Africa Confidential 2000 Vol.41, No 24.*

However, the companies, including Norsk Hydro and Statoil, have hitherto not been willing to contribute to such an increased transparency with reference to their competitive position, even though such information is mandatory when operating in Norway or other western countries.<sup>14</sup> British Petroleum has recently changed its attitude despite the risks implied for its position in Angola if other companies do not follow suit (see Box 4, also the Economist, 13 February 2001).

The oil wealth has reduced the leverage of western international organisations and creditors to influence economic policies through the normal conditionalities, which is why the oil companies themselves have been drawn in. Larger transparency and control of the oil income is necessary for

<sup>14</sup> Norsk Hydro and Statoil were challenged on these points by Simon Taylor of Global Witness in a meeting organised by Norwegian Forum for Environment and Development on 10 October 2000.

accountability, improved resource management and ultimately Angola's socio-economic recovery and development. Similar arguments around oil wealth being a national resource rather than a resource belonging to the national elite and international capital has, of course, also been at the very core of Norwegian oil policies.

#### Box 4

*"Global Witness has long argued that the oil companies operating in Angola, but which are not transparent about their payments to the government, are complicit in the wholesale robbery of the Angolan State. This is because they are not providing data about their payments to the Angolan government when they clearly could do so - in stark contrast to the data they already provide in their reports in the developing world.*

*BP is the first company to recognise that this situation must change, providing a useful step in the process of matching company practise to the rhetoric of the company re-branding process. In a letter dated 6<sup>th</sup> February 2001 to Global Witness BP Group Managing Director Richard Olver stated in addition to maintaining a regular dialogue with the World Bank and IMF over Angola, that the company would publish the following information annually on their operations in Angola:*

- 1. Total net production by Block*
- 2. Aggregate payments by BP to Sonangol in respect of PSA terms.*
- 3. Total taxes and levies paid by BP to the Angolan government as a result of their operations.*
- 4. Signature Bonus payments to Angola*

*"BP have made an excellent move", said Simon Taylor of Global Witness. "This will not have been an easy decision for them, but it is clear that they have recognised the need to end corporate complicity in the state rip-off we are seeing in Angola today. It follows that there are now no excuses for the other companies in Angola not to do the same. So to that end, we are challenging the leadership of other responsible oil companies to publish this data".*

*Source: Global Witness Press release, 12 February 2001.*

## 4. Angola's Politics of Disorder

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Political developments in Angola in 2000 have been characterised by a military situation increasingly in favour of the Government, and a presidency trying to balance pressures for dialogue and reconciliation with its own preference for a tougher stand against Savimbi and UNITA's military wing.

Internationally, Angola has moved more troops to the Democratic Republic of Congo, filling the vacuum which followed the death of President Cabila 16 January 2001. The new president is believed to have close links with the Angolan government, and the succession has consolidated Angola's position as a regional power. Tension between Angola and its other neighbours over the spread of the civil war across their borders has declined in recent months, as the government has come to feel more confident militarily.

Since government forces took over UNITA strongholds in the central highlands (Andulo and Bailundo) in late 1999, UNITA has been gradually weakened. Towards the end of 2000 several UNITA bases along the Zambian border were captured, putting even more pressure on UNITA's ability to supply itself. UNITA has also been weakened by a number of key military personnel either having disappeared or defected. UNITA does maintain the ability to carry out more traditional guerrilla warfare and launch raids against government-held areas, but does not any longer represent a serious threat to the government's grip on power.

With the recent military developments, the chance to capture Jonas Savimbi is growing. This would put the government in an even stronger position both militarily and politically, and make a negotiated solution to the current situation of no-peace-no-war more palatable. However, some commentators argue that Savimbi is more valuable to the government as a weak but free than as a captured political opponent. A stabilised military situation will put more pressure on the government to adhere to the democratic constitution, and to enhance their efforts for socio-economic development.

President Eduardo dos Santos still has a firm grip on power, with his "inner circle" maintaining influence at the expense of the Parliament, the Government and the Judiciary as the other pillars of Angola's democratic constitution. Following a long-term tradition of sidelining potential political opponents (with the prime ministers Marcolino Moco and Lopo de Nascimento and several Ministers of Finance as recent examples), the popular and long-serving head of the armed forces João de Matos was sacked in February 2001.

In fact, the current political situation in Angola seems to fit well with what has been called the "politics of disorder (Chabal and Daloz 1999): "A generalised system of patrimonialism and an acute degree of apparent disorder, as evidenced by a high degree of governmental and administrative inefficiency, a lack of institutionalisation, a general disregards of formal political and

economic sectors, and a universal resort to personal(ized) and vertical solutions to societal problems”.

Despite the strong position of the political authorities in Angola, however, they are under pressure for enhanced democratisation and social responsibility both domestically and internationally. One type of pressure concerns the issue of how to relate to UNITA as the main political opponent and “representative” of the Ovimbundu as the largest ethno-linguistic group in the country. And a second is the pressure to increase its social responsibility, first and foremost through larger allocations to health and education.

#### 4.1 Return to Lusaka or Dialogue?

The Government has responded to pressures for democratic accountability by opening the way for new presidential and parliamentary elections in 2001 (recently officially postponed until 2002).<sup>15</sup> While the weakened position of Unita, the government’s control of Unita defectors in *Unita-Renovada* in Luanda and the continued absence of credible third political forces in Angolan politics would make this feasible, elections will probably not take place in the foreseeable future. The security situation is too difficult in parts of the country to carry out such a process, and despite the lack of alternatives the government is uncertain about whether the population will give it the necessary vote of confidence.

With elections and a “fresh start” unlikely, the government is under pressure to chose one of two alternative strategies. On the one hand there is pressure for dialogue and reconciliation, mainly from Angolan church organisations and external Human Rights movements. Several initiatives have been taken (including the *Pro Paz* Movement and the COIEPA committee for peace), and the churches are widely considered as the only political force in Angola with the political strength to have an impact on national politics. The concern of the churches is not solely with high level politics, but also with what they consider a deep split in the Angolan population following the events after the elections in 1992 (Castello 2000).

The government for its part keeps reminding critics that it is a rightfully elected government, and that the Lusaka Protocol in essence was an attempt at reconciliation giving considerable concessions to UNITA as the losing party of both the Parliamentary and Presidential elections (see Table 7).<sup>16</sup> Moreover, key principles of the Lusaka Protocol have been translated into reality: Angola’s multi-party national assembly, a government of national unity, and integrated armed forces. The government also points out that Unita has used all previous

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<sup>15</sup> The Angolan Constitution states that Parliamentary elections shall be held every 4 years and that a President can sit maximum two periods. The last elections were held in September 1992.

<sup>16</sup> The Lusaka Agreement was formulated under strong pressure from Western countries where victory in Parliamentary or Presidential elections normally implies rights to establish single-party governments. Despite this, pressure was strong on the MPLA to include UNITA in government.

attempts at negotiated settlements to rearm and prepare to take over power by force, and that they cannot be trusted.<sup>17</sup>

**Table 7:** *Results Parliamentary and Presidential Elections, September 1992.*

PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION		PARLIAMENTARY ELECTION	
Candidate	Votes (%)	Party	Members of Parliament
Jose Eduardo dos Santos	49.57	MPLA	129
Jonas Savimbi	40.07	UNITA	70
Alberto Neto	2.16	PRC	6
Holden Roberto	2.11	FNLA	5
Others	6.09	Others	9
Total	100.00	Total	219

Source: Tvedten 1997

Irrespective of new elections, which may change the political map but are unlikely to change the real distribution of power, a final political settlement is likely to be based on a combination of the principles grounded in the Lusaka Protocol and efforts for reconciliation. As argued in the first report, however, none of these strategies are likely to be successfully implemented as long as Jonas Savimbi remains in control of Unita (Tvedten 2000).

## 4.2 Social Renunciation

The apparently limited attention and concern in the Angolan government for the severe social problems in the country is receiving increasing attention both nationally and internationally. The most common point of reference for this criticism is the extremely low budget allocations to the social sectors, primarily education and health (see Table 8). The allocations of 2.5 percent and 1.5 percent to education and health respectively are also low compared to other countries in the region (neighbouring Namibia allocates 25 percent to education alone). As of the beginning of 2001, there are no signs of substantial changes in the allocation of economic resources to health and education.

**Table 8:** *Government expenditures on social sectors (Percent of GDP)*

SECTOR	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999
Education	2.9	2.5	2.8	2.6	2.5
Health	3.3	1.6	1.8	1.4	1.5

Source: EIU 2001

<sup>17</sup> Most foreign governments involved in Angola support this stand, either as a matter of principle or for strategic reasons related to their role in the oil industry.

The government has hitherto argued that economic resources have been needed for military expenses to protect the nation's sovereignty against the rebel movement Unita, and that Angola's heavy debt on poor terms has limited its room for manoeuvre. Counter-arguments have been that the need for heavy military investments have decreased, that better loan conditions would have been obtained if the government had pursued a more constructive economic policy, and that too large parts of the national income are unaccounted for.

Some analysts argue that the lack of allocations to social sectors is not necessarily a sign of social renunciation, but that many key decision-makers are entangled in the system of disorder and dependencies that inhibit action ("politics of disorder"). Others argue that a political elite culture is being developed, in which key political actors detach themselves from the immense and apparently insurmountable social problems in Angola.

What seems to be taking place is an allocation of responsibility for socio-economic development to other stakeholders. During the war the government came to rely heavily on multilateral and bilateral aid organisations and international NGOs for emergency relief and social development. While this still continues (see Chapter 5), recent developments indicate that the government wants to recapture social credibility by bypassing its own public structures and establish separate semi-public structures to be funded by international oil capital.

The Eduardo dos Santos Foundation (FESA) was established in 1996. Portrayed as a philanthropic non-profit venture modelled on the private foundations in the developed world, FESA officially aims to complement the actions of government by promoting social welfare and economic development. FESA has been heavily criticised for being a "private state in the state" and detached from other social development efforts (Messiant 1999). In 1999 the government launched the National Emergency Programme for Humanitarian Assistance (PNEAH) with a secretariat in the Ministry of Planning, and USD 55 million in government funding. And in 2000, an Economic and Social Development Fund was established to be co-ordinated by Sonangol and funded by international oil capital (Hodges 2001).


Without an overall government responsibility and an efficient public system for education and health, however, interventions from aid organisations, NGOs, social funds, oil companies etc. may easily remain uncoordinated and dispatched. Development programmes and projects implemented by external actors will continue to be important, but cannot replace national public policies and structures.



## 5. Development Aid and Social Funds

Development aid to Angola takes place in a context where income from oil is increasing, at the same time as the social situation for the population is deteriorating (see Figure 1). As argued in the first annual report (Tvedten 2000), this should represent a dilemma for aid organisations like NORAD with its strong emphasis on concentrating support to countries with transparent and accountable governments and a favourable human rights record (NORAD 1999).

**Figure 1:** *Oil Income and Human Development*



Sources: Derived from EIU and UNDP.

The most recently available OECD/DAC data, which excludes non-government organisations, put net development assistance to Angola at USD 387.5 mn in 1999. Of this USD 251.8 mn was bilateral aid, and USD 135.7 mn multilateral aid. This represented aid per capita of USD 27.9, which was USD 18 (or 40 percent) less than the average for the Southern African region (UNDP 2000). The United States, Spain, Italy, Japan and Norway are currently the largest bilateral donors, with the European Union, IDA (The World Bank) and the World Food Programme and being the largest multilateral donors (see Table 9).

**Table 9: Net Official Development Assistance 1996-1999 (USD million)**

<b>BILATERAL DONORS</b>	<b>1997</b>	<b>1998</b>	<b>1999</b>	<b>MULTILATE-AL DONORS</b>	<b>1997</b>	<b>1998</b>	<b>1999</b>
United States	22.0	28.8	48.1	EU	70.2	65.4	53.0
Spain	30.9	25.2	35.8	IDA	27.9	35.8	38.8
Italy	9.2	11.0	25.0	WFP	13.5	2.7	27.6
Japan	12.0	17.9	22.0	UNDP	7.7	7.6	7.5
Portugal	29.4	23.9	19.8	UNICEF	3.9	4.9	-
Norway	24.5	23.1	19.8	UNHCR	0.1	0.5	1.6
Germany	15.7	11.8	18.0	Others	8.3	8.7	7.2
Sweden	27.8	22.5	17.8				
Others	92.0	91.0	110.5				
<b>Total</b>	<b>227.0</b>	<b>214.5</b>	<b>251.8</b>	<b>Total</b>	<b>127.7</b>	<b>120.7</b>	<b>135.7</b>

Source: OECD, forthcoming 2001

The bulk of international development assistance to Angola is still in the form of emergency relief, with transitional aid becoming gradually more important and long-term development aid still being limited. This is related partly to the needs of the country, but also to the policies of the aid organisations present in the country. There is currently political pressure from the government for a stronger emphasis on programmes supporting self-reliance (EIU 2001).

Another important characteristic of the aid to Angola is the heavy geographical concentration in Luanda and a few other major provinces (such as Huambo, Bié, Benguela and Huíla). The concentration is the combined outcome of the patterns of war and the preferences of international agencies to “stay where the others are”. Some argue that the geographical concentration is contributing towards the development of “first rate” and “second rate” provinces already implicit in government policies and financial allocations, potentially having severe implications for a further regionalisation of Angola.

A final characteristic to be mentioned is the problems related to government coordination of external aid. Emergency and development aid is formally coordinated by the Ministry of Social Affairs and Reintegration (MINARS) and the Ministry of Planning respectively, but the responsibility is in reality vested with the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). Having said this, there are reports that the cooperation between the Angolan authorities and the aid organisations has improved at provincial levels (SIDA 2000).

The aid picture in Angola is complicated by the activities of semi-private Angolan development funds and international oil companies, often detached from mainstream government policies and development assistance.

Oil companies contribute large sums of money to social and economic development funds, joint projects with Sonangol and FESA (see above). The size of the social funds and other related social activities planned and implemented

by the Angolan petroleum authorities are difficult to ascertain. There are apparently a number of different funds (social development funds, educational funds, small-scale industry funds etc.), and transparency is limited. Well-placed people in the multilateral development organisations argue that there are accumulated funds of USD 200 mn from Blocks 31-33 alone (which is nearly twice the annual multilateral aid budget). The oil companies themselves argued during a meeting with NGOs hosted by the UK Foreign Office Minister Peter Hain in October 2000 that what they call the *Sonangol Development Fund* had a total revenue of USD 40 mn (pers.comm. Simon Tailor, Global Witness). Yet others (such as the well-connected international NGO Development Aid from People to People, DAPP) argued that USD 12 mn is set aside for social development from each signature bonus.

The potential importance of, and uncertainty around, the size of the social funds is a topic of concern for multilateral and bilateral aid organisations, as well as international and national NGOs. Many actively try to position themselves in order to gain access to the money in question. Their argument is that the utilisation of such funds has to be better incorporated into the overall development policy of the government as well as of development organisations, and that they should be used by organisations with sufficient professional skills and experience. Sonangol seems to realise that it has limited competence and capacity to carry out development interventions, and is currently seeking alternative partners for project implementation varying from national NGOs to huge international consulting companies like the US-based Chemonics International ([www.chemonics.com](http://www.chemonics.com)).<sup>18</sup>

Finally, the oil companies also carry out their own development activities as part of their Corporate Social Responsibility. Projects are primarily related to the oil sector in the form of education and training, cultural programmes and sports, but they also carry out development projects in more traditional terms. Most of these projects are planned and implemented without relating to other mainstream development efforts, in order to fulfil the companies' need to make their interventions visible in the political landscape both in Angola and in their home countries. Again BP seems to be the most professional oil company, with an elaborate social development strategy and close relations with people knowing Angola well such as their policy advisor Shawn McCormick and Alex Vines of the Human Rights Watch.

## 5.1 Norwegian Development Aid

Norwegian aid to Angola was NOK 153,966 mn in 1999 (see Table 10). Norway has continued to concentrate its aid around humanitarian assistance and the sectors of energy, education and fisheries, and Norwegian non-governmental organisations remain important channels of implementation (see Chapter 6).

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<sup>18</sup> The search for partners primarily takes place informally, but Sonangol has also e.g. advertised for relevant institutions in the *Jornal de Angola*.

Within the complex Angolan political setting and the dilemmas referred to above, Norway has managed to develop an important position as an international actor and donor. The main reason for this is the high profile and active networking of the Embassy, which has created a basis that is important not only for Norwegian aid interventions but also for the Norwegian oil industry (a fact that does not seem to be sufficiently realised by the companies themselves). Norway had the opportunity to play an even more active and constructive role for peace and reconstruction in Angola through its new position as a member of UN Security Council, but this was forfeited when taking on the responsibility for sanctions against Iraq.

**Table 10:** *Norwegian Development Aid to Angola by Budget Item (NOK mn)*

<b>NORWEGIAN DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE</b>	<b>1997</b>	<b>1998</b>	<b>1999</b>
Long-term development cooperation	79,454	96,907	96,142
Extended cooperation	63	1,837	-
Non-government organisations	10,408	11,666	2,230
Experts and consultants	42	-	230
Industrial and commercial financing facilities	43,169	8,935	-
Multi-bilateral assistance	175	722	-
Research and human resource development	-	-	-
Humanitarian assistance	39,859	54,389	56,321
Peace, reconciliation and democracy <sup>19</sup>	-	-	-
Debt relief	-	-	-
Instalment on loans	-	-	- 1,250
Norfund	-	-	-
Others	32	110	293
<b>Total</b>	<b>173,182</b>	<b>174,566</b>	<b>153,966</b>

Source: NORAD 1999a.

Norwegian aid to Angola currently shows a constructive “mix” of emergency aid (such as support to the World Food Programme); transitional support (such as the TEP educational packages implemented through the Norwegian Refugee Council); long-term development aid (such as the health programmes implemented by Norwegian Peoples Aid); and a number of initiatives related to peace, reconciliation and human rights (such as the support to the peace initiative by Development Workshop). This does not mean that there is not room for improvement, but Norway is an important donor in Angola with an aid profile well adapted to a difficult context.<sup>20</sup>

<sup>19</sup> Considerable parts of Norway’s humanitarian assistance are in fact allocated to peace, reconciliation and democracy, but this is inadequately captured in the structure for budget allocations.

<sup>20</sup> A closer assessment of the projects is beyond the scope of this report. See Endresen 1999 and Johannessen 2000 for recent evaluations of some of the main programmes.

Norfund is in the process of establishing itself in Angola, with a venture fund of USD 20 mn (of which USD 5 mn comes from Norfund itself). Norfund makes risk capital investments in developing countries, concentrating on equity capital for investments in local investment funds and industries. As a first step a Fund Management Company will be established in the first half of 2001. Cooperation in Angola will be established with local industrial partners and private banks, and further cooperation will be sought with national and international private companies primarily in the onshore petroleum sector.

Norwegian oil companies are involved in development interventions through their contributions to social development funds, which altogether represent considerable sums of money (see above). In addition, they also have their own interventions as part of their Corporate Social Responsibility strategies. Norsk Hydro uses a total of USD 500,000 on projects on its own initiative (see Table 11). Statoil, which globally uses more resources on social activities than Hydro, has a smaller portfolio in Angola (Nordås, Tvedten and Wiig 2000). They spent NOK 2 mn (approx. USD 230,000) in 2000 (see Table 12).

**Table 11:** *Development Projects, Norsk Hydro (2000)*

PROJECT	BUDGET (USD)
Sports Sponsorships (Norway Cup, Verket Cup, Mini-Tennis etc.)	57,400
Luanda Sul Community Development	183,000
Educational programmes, incl. Methodist Church/PASOCA	50,700
FESA	100,000
International Child Development Programme (ICDP)	30,000
Culture (book translation, boat to cultural festival in Norway etc.)	23,500
Other activities (including social fundraising)	8,250
Micro-credit schemes/fertilisers	45,000
Total	497,850

Source: Norsk Hydro.

**Table 12:** *Development Projects, Statoil Angola (2000)*

PROJECT	BUDGET (USD)
Norwegian Peoples Aid	115,000
Palanca Boys Home	57,400
UNOA/HR	57,400
Humanitarian Contingency <sup>21</sup>	-
Total	229,800

Source: Statoil.

<sup>21</sup> A contingency of NOK 1,000,000 was not used in 2000.

The challenges for the companies are to find a balance between contributing constructively to social development, and their own (legitimate) need to be visible donors. The former may be easiest to achieve by channelling funds through professional and experienced development organisations (including international and national NGOs), while the latter easily leads companies to carry out development interventions on their own or through high-profile institutions such as FESA with dubious development implications.<sup>22</sup>

Our impression is that the Norwegian companies are still struggling to find the right balance and approach in their social interventions, albeit with differences between the two companies. While Norsk Hydro has a policy of not channelling support via traditional aid channels, Statoil channels as much as possible of their support through the UN system and/or NGOs. The recent donation of NOK 1 mn from Statoil to the Norwegian Refugee Council is in accordance with this policy.

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<sup>22</sup> Norsk Hydro uses FESA actively, while Statoil is not a member. There are also indications that BP is in the process of pulling out of the Foundation.

## 6. The Status and Role of National and International NGOs

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NGOs are an important part of civil society and the development process in Angola. They have emerged and developed during a very brief period of time, starting with the democratisation and liberalisation of the early 1990s and the passing of the Law of Associations in May 1991. Prior to this there were no formally recognised NGOs in the country, and the very notion of NGOs was largely unknown.<sup>23</sup> In early 2001 the number of formally recognised national and international NGOs has surged to 365 and 95 respectively. It is generally agreed that the real number of NGOs and Community Based Development Organisations (CBDOs) is considerably higher.

The growth of the NGO sector has important implications for their status and role in Angolan society. There is a tendency, particularly among international actors, to regard NGOs as all good and all beneficial, and to define national governments that do not give them space as “anti-development”, “anti-democracy” and “anti-human rights”.<sup>24</sup> However, it is also important to assess the status and role of NGOs from the point of view of the national governments and other national stakeholders, and see NGOs as part of a complex setting of rapid political change (see Box 5).

### Box 5

*“Angola tem estado a conheser o despoletar de várias ONGs nacionais e estrangeiras. Muitas perseguem objectivos complicados, outras difusos, mas tudo tem a ver com a falta de um lei das ONGs ou outro documentos que regulamente a sua actividade. O seu discurso muitas vezes ruidoso, ainda que vago, em favor dos pobres, do pleno emprego e de oposição á guerra e as minas é, para algumas destas organizações, mais uma ambição para a obstenção de projecção internacional, do que de uma verdadeira solidariedade e ajuda.*

*No nosso país aporaram muitas ONGs que, de repente, passaram do campo da solidariedade, para o empresarial, mas mantendo o mesmo estatuto e as mesmas facilidades, tais como a isenção aduaneira e fiscal dos artigos e produtos importados, que são canalizaos para a comercialização. E evidente que os ganhos são elevados e a concorrência com os outros operadores económicos real”.*

*Source: Folha 8, 26 December 2000*

<sup>23</sup> There were some international NGOs such as Development Workshop that had been recognised through cooperation accords with the Ministry of External Relations since 1987, but most were defined as solidarity organisations and their personnel as *cooperantes*. Some national church organisations also implemented development projects and functioned as development NGOs, but were not perceived as such.

<sup>24</sup> This tendency refers not only to their role in developing countries. Norwegian NGOs receive at least 80 percent of their funding from the Norwegian government. Despite this, they are largely left in peace and not subject to the same scrutiny as e.g. bilateral development programmes.

We will argue in the following section that both international and national NGOs have an important role in Angola, so far particularly in the areas of emergency and development assistance but increasingly also of democratisation and human rights. This is as it should be both with reference to the need for an active civil society, and the inability (or unwillingness) of the Angolan state to fill necessary social functions. At the same time we will argue for a greater sensitivity as regards the position and role particularly of international NGOs in Angolan society. While they have important emergency and development functions, it is also their responsibility to relate constructively to existing public structures despite their deficiencies and to support more actively the development of an Angolan civil society and NGO sector.

## 6.1 Some Conceptual Clarifications

There is considerable controversy over what really constitutes an NGO (Fowler 1991; Tvedt 1998). Classical definitions tend to be normative and ideological, or so broad that they make discussion and comparison difficult. For the purpose of this report NGOs will be defined as “entities formed on a voluntary, non-profit basis, dedicated to the provision of services or the construction of social alternatives”. It includes NGOs in the classical sense as well as solidarity organisations and churches in their extra-pastoral activities, but excludes labour and professional unions, churches in their religious capacity and the media as additional parts of civil society (Baranyi, Kible et al. 1999).

The number of non-governmental organisations in Africa has grown substantially during past 20 years. This is often seen to have at least two favourable impacts on the continent’s development (Fowler 1991:53). First, NGOs will actively help mitigate the negative social effects of the prevailing macro-economic policies on poor and vulnerable groups. And second, a growing NGO sector will contribute to the needed democratisation of African countries by pluralising and strengthening civil society.

NGOs are also often seen as embodying a number of comparative advantages over governments and aid organisations for improving the situation of the poor (the so-called “Articles of Faith”). They are more cost-effective in service delivery, they have a greater ability to target poor and vulnerable sections of the population, they demonstrate a capacity to develop community-based institutions, and they are better able to promote the popular participation needed for sustainability.

However, the status and role of NGOs have recently come under more critical assessment. Tvedt (1998) argues that NGOs are not in general more flexible or more efficient than governments. On the contrary, they may be less efficient and less flexible in certain cases because they do not have the sanctions available to governments, nor the “universalistic” approach that governments generally adopt. There is also a gap between images of the NGO channel and what the organisations are in fact able to achieve. Rather than alleviating poverty and promoting equity NGOs perform a maintenance function, and may help preserve differences among classes and reduce the pressure for more radical reforms. Finally, the fact that most northern NGOs are increasingly dependent



on government funding for their activities renders the very notion of “non-government organisations” rather meaningless. Some of them also find themselves in a grey zone between being development organisations and private enterprises with profit motives.

## 6.2 A Brief Historical Overview

Defined in a broad sense, non-governmental organisations have been part of Angolan society for centuries. Traditional communities boasted self-help organisations independent of royal and later colonial powers; the churches and missions in Angola had both social and advocacy roles in addition to their religious activities; and associations, particularly in urban areas, represented the embryo of what developed into organised resistance movements in the 1960s (Tvedten 1997, Castello 2000).

After Independence from the Portuguese in 1975 and the introduction of the centralised one-party state, emerging local associations and mass organisations had important functions but were under strict government control. During the 1980s foreign organisations initiated relations with mass organisations as well as the development wings of churches, but were defined as “solidarity movements” and “cooperantes” rather than NGOs. Among the most important national organisations were the *Organização das Mulheres Angolanas* (OMA), *União Nacional de Trabalhadores Angolanos* (UNTA), Caritas Angola and the Angolan Council of Evangelical Churches (CAIE). The Canadian/French *Development Workshop*, the Swedish *Afrikagrupperna* and the *Norwegian Peoples Aid* were early foreign non-government organisations active in Angola.

The process towards peace, democratisation and liberalisation initiated in the later 1980s came with increasing attention towards the role of civil society and non-government organisations in the development process. External pressure for political and economic reform following the end of the Cold War was important, but so were internal developments. Both the Catholic and Protestant churches issued statements at the end of 1989 calling for the war to stop and the holding of free elections, and the Angolan Civic Association (ACA) was formally launched in January 1990 with a clear advocacy objective. The deteriorating support and respect for the party and public authorities became noticeable at that time at all levels, and led to a number of attempts to form independent associations (Sogge 1992).

The first signs of a changing attitude from the government towards NGOs as independent organisations came with the establishment of *Acção Angolana para o Desenvolvimento* (AAD) in November 1989 (albeit established by patrons drawn from the MPLA political elite). From early 1991 the government started to pass legislation recognising the rights of political parties, freedom of assembly and association, the right to strike, freedom of the press etc. The Law of Associations (*Lei de Associação 14/91 of May 1991*) was established to regulate the activities of both national and foreign NGOs (see Appendix 4). The law is brief and general in scope, but does represent a relatively strong legal protection of civil society. The preamble to the law reads (Box 6):

## BOX 6

*“A criação das condições materiais e técnicas para a edificação em Angola de um Estrado democrático de direito é um dos objectivos a atingir, na actual fase de reformas políticas e sociais.*

*Porém, a materialização de tal objectivo exige a participação activa e consciente de todos os cidadãos através das formas previstas na Lei Constitucional nomeadamente, no exercício do direito da associação estabelecido pelo artigo 24 daquele lei.*

*Algumas das disposições, que nos artigos 167 e 184 do Código Civil regulavam essa matéria, mostram-se desajustadas face às novas exigências decorrentes da aplicação da democracia, tendo em vista uma maior participação da sociedade civil nos destinos da Nação.*

*Tendo em conta que as associações prosseguem de entre outros, fins profissionais, científicos, culturais, recreativos e que o seu âmbito pode ser nacional, regional ou local conforme a extensão onde exerçam a sua actividade, todos os cidadãos podem, nos limites da lei, constituir associações, sendo estas autónomas, não havendo interferência dos poderes públicos quanto à prossecução dos seus fins”.*

*Source: Lei no. 14/91 (Diário da Republica, Sábado 11 de Maio de 1991).*

On the other hand, Law 14/91 is not very specific on important issues such as institutional responsibilities for the NGO sector in government structures, and the rights and duties of the NGOs related to the practical implementation of actual programmes and projects. The former implied that NGOs had to relate to a number of different government bodies, and the latter implied considerable confusion around the legal status of personnel, acquisition of goods and services, import duties and taxes etc. In a Southern African regional context there were at the time NGO laws that yielded more space and were more specific on rights and duties, but there are also countries where the law was more restrictive.

The government institutions themselves were also uncertain how to relate to the emerging international and national NGOs. The system of public administration was extremely weak, and the NGOs with their multifaceted policies and purposes did not easily fit into any key ministry. The uncertainty is evident by the changes in coordinating government bodies since the end of the 1980s, with the Ministry of External Relations, the Ministry of Planning, the Ministry of Commerce (!) and the Ministry of Social Affairs and Reintegration being responsible at different points in time. The shifts were partly of a political nature, but also reflect a genuine concern of how to accommodate large and resourceful NGOs into weak government structures without relinquishing national sovereignty.

To coordinate activities and undertake advocacy work with the government, the *Comité das Organizações Não-Governamentais em Angola* (CONGA) was established in early 1988. CONGA was initially dominated by foreign NGOs, due both to their larger number and to their superior human and economic resources. An alternative network (FONGA, *Forum das ONGs Angolanas*) was established in 1991, primarily organising national NGOs. The split should at least partly be seen as an expression of differences in objectives, capacity and resources between the two categories of NGO.

Despite the opening up of political space for NGOs, the number of both international and national NGOs was initially relatively modest. This was related to the continued uncertainty about political developments in Angola, and a consequent reluctance by international NGOs to establish themselves in the country. Already from the early 1990s, however, the establishment and growth of national NGOs was closely linked to the number of international NGOs. The former soon came to see the latter not only as professional partners, but equally much as potential sources of funding.

With the resumption of war after the elections in late 1992, the politico-military setting in Angola increasingly turned towards an emergency situation and the democratic development received severe blows. UNITA could no longer claim peaceful and democratic intentions, and there was increasing centralisation of power in the hands of the President. The apparently contradictory effect of this was an increase in the number of foreign NGOs, most of which were working with emergency interventions. In fact, NGOs largely came to act as contractors to donors and UN agencies.

With the increasingly important role of NGOs for emergency and development interventions and their international legitimacy, the government had little choice but to accept and relate to their presence as best they could. The increasing presence of international NGOs also led to a new upsurge in the number of national organisations. In 1996, 26 national and international NGOs were officially registered. The national NGO scene was dominated by a small number of well-funded and well-supported NGOs, such as AAD, the *Ação para Desenvolvimento Rural e Ambiente* (ADRA) and national subsidiaries of large international NGOs such as the Red Cross and the YMCA. Still, the large majority of national NGOs were small with limited competence, capacity and funds.

Concerted efforts to enhance the capacity of national NGOs from multilateral agencies, bilateral agencies and international NGOs were limited. In fact, development institutions such as USAID had an explicit policy of not supporting national capacity building, and even the Swedish International Development Agency (SIDA) had restrictive policies in this regard.<sup>25</sup> The relatively few international NGOs primarily working with long-term development, such as Development Workshop and African Humanitarian Action (AHA), were exceptions to the rule with close relations to national NGOs from the very beginning.

Towards the end of the 1990s, the number of international and national NGOs again increased dramatically. With the continued uncertainty in the politico-military situation and the inadequacy of government interventions, international NGOs have maintained their central role both in multilateral and bilateral aid with national NGOs following suit as best they can. In addition,

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<sup>25</sup> SIDA gave funds to DHE in the early 1990s for support to NGOs that only at a later stage became accessible to national non-government organisations.

the end of the 1990s saw an upsurge in the number of NGOs working with human rights, as a result both of external pressure and support (primarily from the UN and the US) and of increasing internal dissatisfaction with the human rights situation in the country.

With this situation it is hardly surprising that many ordinary Angolans had begun to see the NGOs and their donor patrons, rather than the state, as the main providers of basic social services, humanitarian relief and resources for rehabilitation. As argued earlier in this report, the willingness of donors and NGOs to take on these responsibilities made it possible for the government to divert oil income for other purposes. On the other hand, the situation was more and more of an embarrassment to the government. It began losing legitimacy not just in the eyes of the international community but also before its own people. The population was in fact becoming increasingly less dependent on the state (Hodges 2001:80).<sup>26</sup>

### 6.3 Political Space and Legal Context

At the beginning of 2001, the Technical Unit for the Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance (UTCAH) had registered 365 national and 95 international NGOs in Angola (see Appendices 5 and 6). The bulk of the emergency aid is channelled through such organisations, they are extensively used by bilateral aid organisations, they play an increasingly important role in the advocacy of democracy and human rights, and even the Angolan government has come to rely on them for policy implementation.<sup>27</sup> The increasing importance of NGOs takes place within a political power structure that is susceptible to enhanced pressure for opening up more space for civil society, and that at the same time is concerned about the implications of this for their own sovereignty and political control.

To regulate and clarify the status and role of NGOs, the Government initiated work with a new law on NGOs (*Aprova o Código das Organizações Não Governamentais*) in 1996. At that time the activities of national as well as international NGOs were still governed by the Law of Association discussed above as the overall policy instrument, with other laws (on labour, procurement of goods and services, taxation etc.) being applied for specific aspects of NGO management and project implementation.

The initiative to develop a new NGO law originally came from the Ministry of Social Affairs and Reintegration (MINARS), with the international consulting company KPGM as legal advisors. Neither CONGA or FONGA, nor individual NGOs were part of the process. However, in 1997 the efforts to establish the new law and its content became known to the NGOs. At the time the NGOs were concerned not only with the lack of consultation as such, but also with

<sup>26</sup> In the memory of most people the state had been important despite its deficiencies. Access to state health and educational facilities did e.g. improve considerably after Independence, and access to government-funded food rationing cards was vital up to 1990, particularly in urban areas.

<sup>27</sup> As an example, the Ministry of Agriculture largely depends on NGOs to distribute grain to rural areas.

aspects of the draft law that they found to restrict their activities rather than create new space and clarify formal processes.<sup>28</sup>

Some 5-7 key NGOs under the joint auspices of FONGA and CONGA subsequently became involved in a consultative process with the Government, with their own legal advisor. The NGOs initially argued for working out the new legal framework as regulations or provisions to the existing Law on Associations (*Regulamento para as ONGs Que Operam em Angola*), rather than a new law substituting the existing Law 91/14. This, they felt, would safeguard political protection and make it possible to focus on regulations of bureaucratic procedures that the NGOs had found to be particularly cumbersome. With reference to the wide range of sectors in which the NGOs work, FONGA/CONGA also argued for the establishment of a Permanent Commission under the Council of Ministers (*Comissão Permanente do Conselho de Ministros*) with principal responsibility for coordinating and administering the activities of NGOs. However, the proposals were not supported by MINARS and the Ministry of Justice, and subsequent work focused on improving the original government proposal.

The law had been in the making around four years with varying degrees of involvement by the NGOs, when it was announced that a final proposal of the NGO law would be presented to the Council of Ministers by the end of 2000 for approval.<sup>29</sup> The final proposal disregarded many of the substantial comments made by the NGOs. The NGOs had not only found it difficult to get their views across to the political authorities, but also to the legal advisors from KPMG, who had little or no experience from civil society and NGOs.

Regarding the issue of political space, the general tone of the law is considered more restrictive than the existing law, and it contains several apparent inconsistencies and issues that are not sufficiently clarified. This includes apparently contradictory statements concerning the right to protect and promote human rights (Article 4, 2b) on the one hand, and to refrain from discussing political issues (Article 7, 5d) on the other. Equally serious from the point of view of the NGOs is that the law does not resolve the day-to-day problems experienced by most NGOs. On the contrary, the law outlines an even more cumbersome system of rules and regulations and is vague on the issue of institutional responsibilities.

As it turned out, the proposed law was rejected by the Council of Ministers in November 2000, which can be interpreted as an indication of the political uncertainty and sensitivity surrounding the status and role of NGOs still existing. The fate of the law is currently uncertain. Some argue that the law will be passed in its present form after a period of grace to make this politically

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<sup>28</sup> An indication of the objectives of the Law is found in the preamble, where it reads: “Nesta base torna-se imprescindível o preenhecimento desta lacuna regulamento todos os aspectos desenvolvidos, num quadro jurídico que combalze a política de cooperação entre o Governo Angolano e os seus parceiros Organizações Não Governamentais”.

<sup>29</sup> A copy of the proposed law is available from CMI in Portuguese and a Norwegian translation.

feasible; some argue that the Law of Associations will remain in force for the foreseeable future; and representatives of the NGOs claim that they will continue to work for their original proposal of regulations under the existing Law of Associations.

Administratively the national as well as international NGOs fall under MINARS and UTCAH. MINARS has the overall responsibility for the implementation of national policies related to humanitarian and development aid, and UTCAH is responsible for the formal registration and supervision of NGOs. Both institutions currently seem to have problems defining their real status and role. With the large funds channelled through the emergency and aid systems, other ministries see themselves as equally relevant for playing a coordinating role. Furthermore, UTCAH's position within the government structures is also unclear with other line ministries continuing to be the most important points of reference for many NGOs. UTCAH complains that the organisation is not taken sufficiently seriously as a national authority, particularly by the international NGOs.<sup>30</sup> On top of all this, OCHA and UNDP have *de facto* a much stronger influence on policy decisions and financial allocations than MINARS and UTCAH.

For the NGOs the current political and legal context implies that they can continue to work relatively independently, but in a situation of considerable political uncertainty and practical difficulties. The future political space for NGOs in Angola will depend on politico-military developments and how the government relates to the internal and external pressure for a stronger civil society. However, it will also depend on the policies and practice of the NGOs themselves, and their own sensitivity to the Angolan political context.

## 6.5 National and International NGOs

There are considerable differences in the size, competence and capacity of the 365 national and 95 international NGOs currently registered with the UTCAH. Informants with long-term experience from Angola and the work of NGOs argue that no more than 40-50 national and 20-25 international NGOs are seriously committed to Angola, and have the necessary competence and capacity to continue to work in the country for a longer period of time.

This assessment is based on two assumptions. One is that the majority of national NGOs are too weak and too dependent on external funding to be able to develop into independent, strong and sustainable organisations in their own right. The second is that a large number of the international NGOs have a short-term perspective on their involvement, and are likely to leave the country as soon as the emergency situation is over and accessible funds dry up. The assumptions may be proven wrong, but this will necessitate a change in focus

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<sup>30</sup> Two particular points are mentioned. One is that most NGOs do not follow up their reporting responsibilities to UTCAH. Another is that UTCAH is hardly ever invited by NGOs for discussions, and the NGOs tend to send lower level administrative rather than management personnel when called.

by the international aid organisations towards transitional and long-term development, and a stronger commitment from the government and international aid organisations to support national NGOs.

### 6.5.1 National NGOs

Appendix 5 of this report lists the 365 registered national NGOs in Angola, with their name, geographical location and main areas of concern.

To be legally registered, the NGOs must go through a relatively long and cumbersome process. They have to fulfil specific criteria related to their membership base; show that their objectives are in line with the Law of Associations; and prove a certain financial viability. All NGOs also have to present at least one project proposal. The formal registration is done both in the *Diário da República*, and in the form of a certificate from the Ministry of Justice. In some cases the process of registration has taken more than 4 years. Given the cumbersome process of registration, many NGOs and CBDOs are active without being formally certified. The total number of NGOs in Angola has been estimated at close to one thousand.

Angolans establishing NGOs have different backgrounds and different motivations. Much has been said about the dominance of supposedly egoistic profit motives, but there are no compelling reasons to doubt the seriousness of the large majority of NGOs. The majority of the national NGOs seem to spring out of three main contexts, namely government structures, churches, and individuals with a Bakongo background (so-called “*regressados*”). The latter fits with a general Angolan perception of Bakongo being particularly industrious, but many also have direct experience with various types of association in Zaire and the Democratic Republic of Congo (Tvedten 1997, Robson 2001).

The large majority of the national NGOs are based in Luanda, with other areas of concentration being the provinces of Benguela, Huila and Huambo. The heavy concentration in a limited number of provinces is primarily related to population concentrations in the country and the history of war and insecurity. It is also, however, related to conditions such as the attitude of provincial authorities towards NGOs, and the preference of international funding agencies (and hence national NGOs) to work “where the others are”.

A survey carried out by UNDP in 1999 defined 61 percent of the civic organisations in Angola as NGOs (UNDP 1999).<sup>31</sup> Of the 95 surveyed NGOs, 72 percent carried out work within the area of social services, 64 percent within education, 59 percent in health, and 19 percent in civic education/advocacy (many NGOs work with more than one sector). Projects related to social services include support to displaced people (65 percent), emergency assistance (43 percent), and sanitation and water supply (45 percent). As regards budgets

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<sup>31</sup> The remaining civic organisations were churches/religious organisations (16 percent), cultural associations (11 percent), professional associations (4 percent), and labour unions (3,5 percent) (UNDP 2000).

and financial means, Table 13 gives a broad indication of access to financial funds for the year 2000 among the national NGOs (the survey includes registered NGOs only). As seen, close to 60 percent have budgets of USD 250,000 or less.

**Table 13:** *Utilisation of Funds among National NGOs (%)*

<b>BUDGET IN USD,000</b>	<b>1997</b>	<b>1998</b>	<b>1999</b>	<b>2000</b>
Up to 50	45	46	47	24
51-100	11	7	8	14
101-250	9	10	12	18
251-500	8	8	5	7
501-1000	7	10	9	11
1001-2500	13	11	8	13
more than 2500	8	8	12	13

Source: UNDP 2000.

As mentioned above, the *Forum das ONGs Angolanas* (FONGA) was established in 1991 as an umbrella organisation primarily for national NGO members. FONGA has a small secretariat of three persons (including the long-term General Secretary Francisco Tunga Alberto). While the organisation played an important role for the development of national NGOs throughout the 1990s, it has recently experienced problems of both an organisational and a political nature. There is a perception that FONGA is becoming Luanda-based rather than national in scope; that it is developing into a political forum serving special interests;<sup>32</sup> and that it has misunderstood its role by taking on projects in competition with its own members. FONGA is currently trying to re-establish itself as a forceful organisation, and has recently gone through a process of self-evaluation (Jansen 2000).<sup>33</sup>

In addition to FONGA, some national NGOs have formed networks. The best organised and best known network is *Rede Mulheres/Angola* (Box 8). This was established in 1998, and currently counts 90 national and international member organisations. The network has received financial support from a number of institutions, including the Swedish International Development Agency (SIDA), and builds competence and capacity among its member organisations. The *Rede das Crianças* was established in 2000, and is still in the process of developing organisational structures and principles.

<sup>32</sup> The accusations vary from FONGA being too close to the ruling party, to being an instrument for *regressados*.

<sup>33</sup> One strategy not discussed in the self-evaluation is to limit membership only to include the most viable NGOs. While there are pros and cons for such a strategy, it would probably make FONGA into a more coherent and stronger organisation.



## Box 8

*A Rede Mulher/Angola é o fórum sobre a mulher e género, uma organização de carácter não governmental, apartidária sem fins lucrativos e com autonomia administrativa e financeira, constituída formalmente em 04 de Agosto de 1998 em Luanda e de âmbito nacional. A missão da Rede Mulher é de contribuir para a formação da igualdade entre homens e mulheres. Persegue os objectivos seguintes:*

- *Criar uma Rede de Comunicação, Informação e Troca de Experiência Sobre as Questões de Género e Desenvolvimento*
- *Reforçar a capacidade Institucional dos Membros, Parceiros (governmental e parametar) sobre as Questões de Género e Desenvolvimento*
- *Fazer Lobby e Advocacia Junto das Entidades Governmentais e Parlamentares Sobre a Problemática do Género e Desenvolvimento*
- *Facilitar a Conjugação de Esforços e de Recursos Humanos, Financeiros Técnico Materiais e Jurídicos que visem reforçar as organizações membros.*

*Source: O Que é Rede Mulher/Angola, Luanda 2001*

The national NGO scene has been dominated by the *Acção para o Desenvolvimento Rural e Ambiente* (ADRA), which in terms of personnel, resources and project portfolio has been far superior to other NGOs. ADRA is involved in emergency aid, development work and capacity building of Angolan NGOs. The focus is currently on the *Programa de Desenvolvimento Institucional* (PDI). ADRA is well funded, and works for a large number of different clients.<sup>34</sup>

An informal survey carried out for this study among some of the international and national NGOs, multilateral and bilateral aid agencies identified *Associação Cristã da Sociedade* (ACM), *Solidariedade Cristã de Ajuda Mutua* (SCAM), *Acção Cristã de Jovens de Angola* (ACJ), *Acção pela Vida* (APV), *Acção para a Promoção Social* (APS) and *Club de Jovens* (Huila) as other strong national NGOs in addition to ADRA. There are also a number of NGOs “in the making”. Most of these grow on the basis of a combination of their own hard work, and constructive relations with external funding agencies. Among these are the *Associação Juvenil para o Desenvolvimento Comunitário de Angola* (AJUDECA), *Kassulos do Maculusso Association* (AKM), and *Ninho da Infância/TRINDADE*.

The church-based organisations represent a special category of NGOs, due to the strong position of both Catholic and Protestant churches in Angola. This position not only makes it possible to implement development projects with both political and popular support, but has also put the churches in a situation where they can do active advocacy work for peace and reconciliation without running the same risks as others would. Nevertheless, representatives of the church-based organisations argue that the churches are still not sufficiently strong and well organised to represent a real political force at a national level.

<sup>34</sup> In the process of growing from a small NGO to a large development organisation ADRA has (in line with many other organisations in similar situations) experienced internal unrest related both to its objectives and to its partners of cooperation. Several employees have recently left the organisation.

The Catholic development organisation CARITAS is the largest church-based development organisation, with representations in practically all provinces. Traditionally, the Catholic Church has been closest to the ruling party MPLA. The evangelical churches are organised into *Acção das Igrejas em Angola* (AIA), an ecumenical aid consortium of Angolan churches, national NGOs and northern Christian agencies working to provide effective and co-ordinated support for relief, rehabilitation and long-term development. Members include AEA (*Alliança dos Evangelicos de Angola*) and CICA (*Conselho de Igrejas Christãs de Angola*).<sup>35</sup>

A final category of national NGOs are those working with human rights issues. Having been sanctioned throughout the 1990s, they are still few in number. Most of them are supported financially by the United Nations Office in Angola (UNOA) or USAID. The Human Rights NGOs are primarily following up human rights violations in the legal system, and doing advocacy work. A good example is *Mao Livres*, an organisation created in 2000 with UNOA support and with lawyers and journalists as key members. The organisation has its own programme on the national radio, and a separate page to air their views and answer questions in the daily *Journal de Angola*.

Having presented some of the stronger national NGOs, the large majority of Angolan NGOs are still small with limited capacity and financial means, depending on funding from external sources, and with unclear goals and working strategies. While most of these are likely to have a short lifespan, there is still a large number with a sufficient potential in terms of human resources and social base to become important given the right type of support. The main strengths of these organisations are their first-hand experience with Angolan society, their cultural competence and the importance of succeeding both for altruistic and personal reasons. Their main weaknesses seem to be related to general administration, project formulation and budgeting.

#### 6.5.2 International NGOs

Most of the world's largest and best known international NGOs (AAA, CARE International, OXFAM, Save the Children, MSF, ACORD, GTZ etc.) are present in Angola, with the total number currently being 95 (see Appendix 6). The majority of these primarily work with emergency-related and transitional interventions, with a minority concentrating on longer-term development aid. None of the international NGOs have human rights advocacy as the principal objective of their work, even though some (like Development Workshop and Trocaire) do work related to peace and reconciliation.<sup>36</sup>

According to the UNDP study referred to above (UNDP 1999), the majority of the international NGOs have budgets exceeding USD 500.000 (see Table 14).

<sup>35</sup> Also the *Ireja Kimbanguista em Angola* (IKA) is a member. The Kimbanguista Church was founded by Simon Kimbangu in Zaire in 1921. Being an "African" church and having been regarded as political both because of its ideology emphasising self-reliance and its strong links with the Bakongo in northern Angola, it was actively suppressed during the one-party state era.

<sup>36</sup> This is primarily done through a promising Peace-building Programme, involving a large number of Angolan civil society organisations.

The study also points out that the international NGOs normally have weak links both with the state and with the private sector in Angola. Most of the NGOs are primarily funded by the governments in their respective countries of origin, and have close professional relations with their own bilateral aid agency in cases where that is relevant.

**Table 14:** *Utilisation of Funds among International NGOs*

<b>BUDGET IN USD ,000</b>	<b>1997</b>	<b>1998</b>	<b>1999</b>	<b>2000</b>
Up to 50		4	4	
51-100	9	12	4	
101-250	17	4	12	14
251-500	9	12	4	
501-1000	13	23	28	29
1001-2500	44	31	28	38
more than 2500	9	15	20	19

Source: UNDP 2000.

A further assessment of the work of the international NGOs in Angola is beyond the scope of this report, but there is little doubt that they are vital for both emergency and development interventions in the current situation in Angola<sup>37</sup>. Special mention should be made of Development Workshop which has, through its long-term presence, close collaboration with the government and national NGOs and sustained leadership, developed a unique position among the international NGOs (see Box 10). The largest NGO in terms of funding is Norwegian Peoples Aid (NPA), with activities in humanitarian aid, long-term development as well as demining (see Section 6.7).

#### Box 10

*Development Workshop has been working in Angola since 1981, and was for many years the only NGO in the country. DW first came to Angola at the national government's request to assist in developing policies and programs for self-help housing. Subsequently, DW participated with local government and community based partners in the first integrated squatter upgrading programme in the musseque (informal settlement) in Luanda. DW has adopted a strategy of working closely with local government and community organisations. DW's assistance has been instrumental in building the capacity of Angolan civil society partners during the crucial years since 1991. DW's current Angola programme focus is on peri-urban communities where infrastructure and other basic services are virtually non-existent and on support for rehabilitation of social infrastructure in war affected areas in the provinces.[]*

*The programme strategy for Angola supports the institutional strengthening of national NGOs, community-based organisations, churches and local government authorities.*

*Source: "Development Workshop 2000"*

<sup>37</sup> The work of the major NGOs in Angola is presented on their respective web pages. There seem to be curiously few external evaluations of their activities.

The *Comité das Organizações Não-Governamentais em Angola* (CONGA) has, as mentioned above, developed into a joint forum primarily for international NGOs. The leadership function circulates among the main NGOs, and CONGA has not had a permanent secretariat. While this has implied a distribution of responsibility and work between several organisations, it has also reduced their impact both among international NGOs themselves and in their relation to the government and national NGOs. Another weakness is that the most active NGOs are those with the longest experience in Angola, while the NGOs with the most limited experience who would benefit most from active participation are much less involved (the latter group includes most of the Norwegian NGOs). Key players in CONGA have realised these problems, and a new *CONGA Reformada* is in the process of being established, with a small liaison group and an information officer.

While the large NGOs are important particularly for implementing emergency and transitional aid, many of them isolate themselves and carry out activities largely on their own or with other foreign partners. This is partly related to the difficult political context and the lack of government structures and a viable private sector, but it also reflects the way many of them work globally (Ridell and Kruse 1997). Added to this is the principle in many of the large international NGOs of revolving their top management, with negative implications for continuity. The limited transparency and emphasis on public relations has contributed to relatively widespread perceptions in Angolan society of international NGOs being “rich islands in an ocean of poverty”, and of large parts of their funding going to salaries and expensive cars.

## 6.6 Building Competence and Capacity

Most international NGOs have a stated goal of working closely with national NGOs. This is done with reference to the relevance and efficiency of the work they do in Angola, as well as the importance of strengthening local civil institutions in the country as a goal in itself.

There are many indications that cooperation with and capacity building of national NGOs is weaker in Angola than in most other countries in the region. Two reasons for this pointed out by the international NGOs themselves are i) that with a few exceptions the competence and capacity of the national NGOs is very weak and strengthening their capacity will imply too much time, effort and resources, and ii) that in emergency situations like the one in Angola implementing projects and saving lives has to be given higher priority than the longer-term goal of capacity building.

Capacity building takes place through two main mechanisms. One is by involving Angolan NGOs and individuals directly in the work of international aid organisations including NGOs. While there are many Angolans employed in the international NGOs in administrative and practical functions, very few Angolans have higher management positions in these organisations. OIKOS-*Cooperação e Desenvolvimento* is the only one with an Angolan director. Some (including Development Workshop) have Angolans in senior and middle

management positions, who have influence in terms of their long-term experience and employment with the organisation.

A second mechanism for capacity building is training through special courses or other similar interventions. There has been a large number of such initiatives the past few years. The most comprehensive have been implemented by UNDP, and PACT (“Private Agencies Collaborating Together Inc.”) funded by USAID. The programmes are based on courses in basic management, including issues of project formulation, budgeting, general management, communication techniques and project implementation. NGOs are selected for participation through comprehensive selection processes. The currently most comprehensive effort is the *Programa de Desenvolvimento Institucional* (PDI), carried out by ADRA and partially funded by NORAD (see Box 11).

A large number of NGOs have gone through courses of this type. However, the problem remains that very few of these organisations manage to come in positions where they can try out what they have learnt and gain experience as NGOs. Independent funding is difficult to obtain, and still largely depends on establishing partnerships with international NGOs. When funding is received, moreover, there are normally no overheads making it possible for the NGOs to maintain activities in between projects.

#### Box 11

*Embora haja organizações em Angola que pretendam trabalhar a numa linha de desenvolvimento participativo, comunitário e sustentável, os seus procedimentos, metodologias e práticas de trabalho com as comunidades contrariam isso. Deriva daí a necessidade de se melhorar a capacidade de intervenção destas organizações. Este resultado constitui uma das prioridades da ADRA neste nova fase do Programme de desenvolvimento Institucional (PDI) face a necessidade da organização melhor contribuit oara o reforço da sociedade civil, aspecto nuclear da sua missão institucional. Serão priorizados quatro níveis de acções:*

- *Reforço da capacidade das ONG, associações e outras organizações formais.*
- *Reforço da acção no âmbito das redes/forums traduzida num maior envolvimento/participação da ADRA*
- *Reforço do trabalho com as organizações comunitárias de base a outras organizações informais.*
- *Reforço do trabalho da ADRA com instituições do Estado especialmente a nível local [] e com as autoridades “tradicionais”*

*Source:ADRA: PDI – Sede Proposat de Continuidade. Luanda 2000*

## 6.7 Norwegian NGOs and NGO Support

NGOs have always had a central place in Norwegian development aid. In 2000 a total of 60 NGOs received NOK 1,056 mn in support through NORAD, which represents around 25 percent of the total bilateral aid budget. Some of the organisations involved in emergency aid receive additional funding from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. For all these organisations, government support represented at least 80 percent of their budgets for development aid.

The five largest NGOs involved in development aid in Norway are (in order of received NORAD funding in 2000): the Norwegian Church Aid (NCA), the Norwegian Peoples Aid (NPA), Save the Children Norway, the Norwegian Red Cross, and the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC). Together, these organisations received a total of NOK 382,625,000.

The NGOs have a special and in many ways privileged position in Norwegian aid, despite their heavy dependence on government funding. Until a considerable cut in government funding to NGOs in 2000 there were few economic constraints on the level of activity, and they have been given wide authority to plan, implement and evaluate their own programmes and projects. In 2000 NORAD funded (fully or partially) a total of approximately 1600 individual projects carried out by Norwegian NGOs. Only a small proportion of these were evaluated on the initiative of NORAD.

Support to national NGOs is a stated objective in Norwegian development aid, with reference to their importance for effective and relevant development interventions as well as the importance of supporting the development of civil society as a goal in itself. This has primarily been done through partnerships between Norwegian and national NGOs, but there has been an increasing awareness in Norad of the alternative of supporting national NGOs directly. A total of 309 local NGOs received direct support for approximately 400 individual projects in 1999. Total allocations to national NGOs were between NOK 60-70 mn in 2000.

Norwegian NGOs get support through framework agreements with NORAD, through country or regional allocations, and (in the case of emergency-related activities) from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The NGOs often cooperate with national NGOs as part of their own project implementation. Direct NORAD support to national NGOs may be given either through country agreement allocations (for Norway's main partners of cooperation), through regional allocations (used for countries that are not main partners of cooperation including Angola), or by way of direct support from NORAD in Oslo administered by the embassies (Budget Post 1547110).

Norwegian NGOs have always had a central place in development cooperation with Angola. The reasons for this have been the difficulty of longer-term bilateral commitments with the unstable politico-military situation, and the problems experienced with the Angolan management of bilateral agreements. In fact, the cooperation between the Norwegian Fishery Directorate and the Angolan Ministry of Fisheries, and the Norwegian Oil Directorate and the Angolan Ministry of Petroleum, are currently the only bilateral programmes being implemented.

All the five major Norwegian NGOs mentioned above have activities in Angola. In addition, smaller NGOs such as YME, the International Child Development Programme (ICDP) and the Norwegian Union of Teachers (NL) are active in

the country. The names of the NGOs and their financial allocations from MFA/NORAD in 2000 are given in Table 15.<sup>38</sup>

**Table 15: NORAD Support to Norwegian NGOs in Angola, 2000**

NORWEGIAN NGO	NORAD	MFA	TOTAL
Norwegian Peoples Aid	20,949,000		20,949,000
Norwegian Church Aid		2,000,000	2,000,000
Save the Children Norway		2,800,000	2,800,000
Norwegian Refugee Council	8,958,000	14,232,000	23,190,000
Norwegian Red Cross		7,000,000	7,000,000
ICDP	4,400,000		4,400,000
YME		583,000	583,000
NL	310,600		310,600
Trauma Care Foundation		348,000	348,000
Others <sup>39</sup>	595,000		595,000

Source: Norwegian Embassy, Angola.

- *The Norwegian Peoples Aid* (NP) has worked in Angola since 1988. Originally their programme was related to rural development interventions with a particular focus on water supply, health and education, but the demining programme is now by far the largest component ([www.folkehjelp.no](http://www.folkehjelp.no)).
- *The Norwegian Refugee Council* (NRC) gives humanitarian assistance to refugees and internally displaced people, and has a large educational programme primarily directed at children through the Teacher Emergency Package (TEP). They initiated their work in Angola in 1995 ([www.nrc.no](http://www.nrc.no)).
- *The Norwegian Red Cross* gives financial support to the International Committee of Red Cross (ICRC) and International Federation of the Red Cross (IFRC) in Angola, but also takes more direct part in an integrated health programme in Kwanza Sul in collaboration with the regional Red Cross organisation ([www.redcross.no](http://www.redcross.no)).
- *The Norwegian Church Aid* (NCA) has been active in Angola since 1986, mainly through financial and project support to local church organisations (such as the Church Action in Angola [CAA] and the Angolan Council of Christian Churches [CICA]), but also more directly to emergency assistance and rehabilitation for internally displaced people through the Lutheran World Federation ([www.nca.no](http://www.nca.no)).

<sup>38</sup> The Norwegian Methodist Church is the Norwegian institution with the longest experience from Angola, dating back to 1949 when the first Norwegian missionary came to Kessua in Malanje. Health and agricultural projects were implemented from 1978, with support from NORAD. A large school rehabilitation project (POSOCA) was started in Luanda in 1993. The current activities in Luanda include a programme for street children.

<sup>39</sup> Includes support to send children to Norway Cup in soccer (NOK 260,000) and Verket Cup in handball (NOK 335,000).

- *Save the Children Norway* initiated its programme in Angola in 1997, but prior to that channelled aid through *Save the Children UK*. The organisation primarily supports basic education and does advocacy work related to the rights of children ([www.reddbarna.no](http://www.reddbarna.no)).
- Finally the International Child Development Programme (ICDP) is involved in work with traumatised children; YME is involved in work with water supply to local areas in the provinces of Cabinda and Luanda ([www.yme.no](http://www.yme.no)); and the Norwegian Union of Teachers is involved in capacity building with the sister union *Sindicato Nacional de Professores* (SINPROF) in Angola.<sup>40</sup>

Norway also channels aid through international NGOs in Angola. As discussed earlier, a major part of the support to multilateral agencies (OCHA, UNDP, WFP, UNICEF etc.) is implemented by such organisations. NORAD has influence on the utilisation of these funds though their involvement in the annual Consolidated Inter-Agency Appeal (UN 2000). NORAD also gives direct support to the international NGOs Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF), TROCAIRE, Development Workshop and Ibis. The bulk of the Norwegian aid money directly or indirectly channelled through international NGOs goes to emergency-related interventions (see Table 16).

**Table 16:** *NORAD Support to International NGOs*

INTERNATIONAL NGOs	2000
Trocaire/UNOA-HRD	2,230,000
Development Workshop (Church initiative)	1,500,000
Development Workshop (Culture)	500,000
Ibis (Culture)	500,000

Source: The Norwegian Embassy, Angola.

The direct support to national NGOs is primarily taken from the regional allocation, and is hence part of the regular planning and reporting procedures. There are also options for obtaining additional NORAD funding to national NGOs through special budget allocations such as allocation 1547110 (“Direct Support via the Embassies”), but the Embassy currently does not make use of this. The largest local recipient of Norwegian development aid is currently ADRA, receiving NOK 3.7 mn for its Institutional Development Programme (PDI) in 2000. Other national NGOs receiving Norwegian support are Church Action Angola and *Rede de Mulher* (the Angolan Lawyer Association and the research institution AIP are not NGOs *per se* even though they work with NGOs) (Table 17).

<sup>40</sup> For more background information to the history of Norwegian NGOs in Angola, see Tvedten 1996.



**Table 17: NORAD Support to National NGOs**

<b>NATIONAL NGOs</b>	<b>2000</b>
The Angolan Lawyer Association	36,000
Angola-Instituto de Pesquisa Económico e Social	1,422,000
ADRA	2,700,000
Church Action Angola (CAA)	114,000
Rede da Mulher	33,000

Source: The Norwegian Embassy, Angola.

All the Norwegian NGOs have clear policies of working closely with national NGOs through partnerships. These are emphasised by the management in the central offices in Norway, and most of the NGOs also have written policy statements regarding cooperation with local partners.

However, the representations in Angola argue that it is very difficult to live up to these policies in Angola with reference to i) difficulties of identifying proper partners of cooperation, ii) the weak competence and capacity of those they are familiar with, and iii) the need to give priority to effective project implementation given the serious problems of poverty and vulnerability in the country.

Another reason for the limited cooperation with national NGOs seems to be the relative isolation of the Norwegian NGOs from other parts of the aid milieu in Angola. None of them take an active part in CONGA, where they would be able to draw on important information from the more experienced and active non-governmental organisations. Most of them also have limited contacts with the multilateral and bilateral aid organisations, including NORAD.

Having said this, there seems to be individual differences in their real commitment to establish such relations:

- *Save the Children Norway* show the strongest commitment by demanding that all projects and programmes shall be implemented in partnership with local NGOs. The organisation currently attempts to do this through active involvement in the recently established “Rede das Crianças”.
- *Norwegian Church Aid* has shown in practice that they are committed to interventions through partnerships, by having implemented all their activities in the past 15 years through local sister organisations.
- *Norwegian Red Cross* works with international and national Red Cross organisations as a matter of both principle and practice, and has consistently done so in Angola.
- *Norwegian Peoples Aid* argues that they have a clear goal of working more closely with national NGOs, but that this is difficult and that they cannot find organisations with the necessary competence and capacity. They also emphasise the need to follow up national partners closely, particularly in their financial management.

- *The Norwegian Refugee Council* does not emphasise cooperation with local institutions (except with churches and mission stations that help them with practicalities when they initiate work in new locations). They argue that work with national NGOs is not as relevant for organisations like NRC doing emergency-related work.

None of the Norwegian NGOs in Angola invest in capacity building of national NGOs as an objective in its own right. There does not seem to be a tradition for this among Norwegian NGOs, and they do not have particular qualifications in this area. Some also argue that it is difficult to obtain funding for projects with outputs as vague as “institutional development” and “capacity building”.<sup>41</sup> With such a point of departure, cooperation with national NGOs easily comes to be seen as hindering effective project implementation and as an additional burden to a workload that is already considerable.

Given the overall objective of contributing to social and economic development in Angola, it is important to assess the utility of closer cooperation with national NGOs not only in terms of immediate effects on project implementation, but also in terms of its effect on the longer-term development in the country. It is our assessment that considerably more could be done both by NORAD and by the Norwegian NGOs to support the development of Angolan non-government organisations.<sup>42</sup> There is, as we see it, a sufficient number of national NGOs with potential competence and capacity to make such an effort feasible.

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<sup>41</sup> Institutional development is, of course, an increasingly important part of Norwegian development aid, and useful ways of measuring their output have been identified (see Tvedten et.al 1997).

<sup>42</sup> Institutional capacity building of national NGOs through “twinning” seems to fit well with the objectives of the new Norwegian Peace Corps (“Fredskorpset”)

## 7. Conclusions

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National and international NGOs in Angola are part of a complex political setting in constant change. Their status and role cannot only be assessed by focussing on the impact of their programmes and projects in isolation. Equally important is the question of how they relate to other parts of Angolan society. For a sustainable recovery, the state, the civil society and the private sector all have to interrelate constructively.

As we have discussed in this and the preceding report (Tvedten 2000), the state and the private sector in Angola are currently extremely weak, leaving political and social space for a civil society defined broadly as “informal and formal institutions between the state and the household that are not private enterprises with profit motives”.

We know far too little about the informal components of civil society in Angola, in the form of traditional institutions, local associations, social relations and networks, except that they are probably extremely important for peoples’ daily coping strategies both in urban and rural areas.

The space for formal civil society institutions was, as shown in this report, enhanced with the process of democratisation and liberalisation in the early 1990s. It is not difficult to find support for arguments that despite this, the church, professional and labour unions, the media and NGOs have functioned under very difficult conditions throughout the 1990s. There is a large number of examples of political repression and serious human rights violations on the part of the government (see e.g. Tvedten 1997, Vines 1999, Hodges 2001).

It is, however, also possible to identify incidents indicating that civil society has captured space and plays an increasingly important role in Angola. The churches are increasingly pulling in one direction, as demonstrated by joint organisations and a number of initiatives for peace and reconciliation. Labour unions are still weak, but professional unions (as for teachers and lawyers) have been able to influence events through concerted action. And despite serious setbacks in the form of assassinated journalists and closed newspapers, the Angolan media do produce critical articles about political and social issues.

In this context, national NGOs have an important role to play both for social development and for human rights. They represent a broad spectrum of social categories and interest groups, and have a flexibility that may make them into effective development agents and human rights advocates. To be able to have an influence for development and human rights, we will argue that the NGOs must strike a balance between relating constructively to the state, the private sector and other parts of civil society and working for alternative development strategies and radical change.

The international community, including international NGOs, has a particular responsibility for contributing towards such a process. For NORAD and Norwegian NGOs, the following should be more closely assessed:

- NORAD should take more initiatives for following up and evaluating NGOs than they currently do, in order to secure the necessary quality of their work.
  - NORAD should give stronger emphasis to the responsibility of Norwegian NGOs to develop national NGOs' capacity.
  - NORAD should require that all programme and project applications from Norwegian NGOs include cooperation with a national NGO.
  - NORAD should be more willing to allocate funds to NGO institutional development projects, even if this implies a certain risk and less tangible outputs.
  - NORAD should make the budget post 1547110 ("Direct Support via the Embassies") more readily accessible to all Embassies.
  - NORAD should assess the option of making "twinning" between Norwegian and national NGOs an important part of the "New Peace Corps" (*Nye Fredskorpset*).
- 
- Norwegian NGOs in Angola should put stronger emphasis on building the capacity and competence of Angolan NGOs.
  - Norwegian NGOs in Angola should include cooperation with national NGOs in all their programmes and projects in the country.
  - Norwegian NGOs in Angola should take a more active part in national and international NGO organisations and networks, in order to enhance their own competence and capacity.
  - Norwegian NGOs in Angola should include more Angolans in management positions.

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<http://www.angonet.org>  
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## Annex 1: List of Persons Met

NAME	INSTITUTION
Thor Oftedal Harald Ekker	Norwegian Embassy, Angola
Alain Caine	Development Workshop, Angola (DW)
Paula Carosi Ana Teresa Lopes da Silva	Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA)
Casamira Bengé Hanock Barlevi Gurprat S. Samrow	United Nations Children Fund (UNICEF)
Annie Brenne Svendsen Ellen Dahl	Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC)
David Mendes Salvador Freire	Mao Livres
Alfonso Barragues	UN Observer Mission in Angola- Human Rights Division (MONUA-HRD)
Gabriel Tibúrcio António Cardoso Santos	Programa Angolano de Capacitação e Treinamento Organizacional (PACTO)
Aiden McQuade	OXFAM, UK
Sherri Lecker	Save the Children Fund, UK
Constance S. Brathwaite	African Humanitarian Action (AHA)
Isabelle Waltin	International Medical Corps (IMC)
Manuel Neto Dino Major	Acção para o Desenvolvimento Rural e Ambiente (ADRA)
Eivind Ålborg *	Norwegian Church Aid (NCA)
Susan K. Dow	Save the Children Fund, Norway
Paulette Lopes	Advogada (Comité das Organizações não Governamentais em Angola, CONGA)
Anne Traaholt Torstein Sjøtveit *	Norsk Hydro, Angola
Odd Godal *	Statoil
Simon Taylor *	Global Witness
Rikke Viholm	Ajuda de Desenvolvimento de Povo para Povo (ADPP)
Dag Høiland Ingeborg Hollerud	Norwegian Peoples Aid (NPA)
Per Emil Lindøe *	Norfund
Emília Dias Fernandes	Rede Mulher/Angola
Robert Jan Bulten	CARE, Angola
Eduardo Domingos	Ministério de Educação, Direcção Nacional de Ensino geral (MED/DNE)
Benjamin Castello	Acção da Igrejas em Angola (AIA)
Francisco Tunga Alberto	Forum de Organizações Não Governamentais em Angola (FONGA)
Mpembele Daniel Manuel Mfulutome	Associação Juvenil para o Desenvolvimento Comunitário de Angola (AJUDECA)
Luis Bizerra	Ministério de Ajuda Humanitária e Reincêrço Social/ Unidade Técnica para a Coordenação de Ajuda Humanitária (MINARS/UTCAH)
Erling Eggen * Jorid Almås * Tor Haug *	Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation (NORAD)

- Telephone/E-mail interview

## Annex 2: Terms of Reference Country Report, Part I

### 1. Background

NORAD and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs acknowledge the need for assistance from external resources in the form of reviews of economic, social, political and cultural conditions in selected countries of principal co-operation to augment Norwegian country specific knowledge. This country report is intended to be one such device for increased knowledge.

### 2. Objectives

The objectives of this kind of report is to complement NORAD's and the Embassies' knowledge about the selected countries of principal co-operation by increasing the understanding of economic and social conditions in the selected countries of principal co-operation and thereby increasing the competence to deal with economic, institutional and social problems.

As the amount of information and documentation from competent local and international organisations and agencies is huge, the need for external topical competence is to synthesise, analyse and evaluate the available information, to analyse general developmental trends, and possibly to participate in planning processes. Furthermore, in order to acquire an overall perspective of the present situation in these countries, it is also important to address other issues such as historical, cultural, sociological and political aspects.

### 3. Scope of work

To generate information to establish the necessary background knowledge, the work shall include, but not necessarily be limited to, presenting and assessing the following:

#### *1. Economic and institutional indicators:*

- the selected countries' present economic performance by looking at macro-economic trends, strengths and weaknesses;
- possible bottlenecks to development of the economic sector;
- current trends in national plans, policies and strategies to improve economic performance;
- ongoing administrative reforms (Civil Service Reforms, Public Expenditure Reforms) and assess the domestic capacity, the resources available and the political will to undertake administrative reforms;
- trends in public expenditures and income;

- trends in bilateral and international agencies' on-going and planned assistance to the country.

## *2. Social, political and cultural indicators*

- the development in social indicators;
- to briefly describe obstacles to an effective implementation of development programmes;
- political will to reform the political system and to consolidate democracy, human rights and equality and to alleviate poverty.

*The work shall be carried out through:*

- desk studies;
- discussions with the authorities, local NGOs, and local researchers as well as bilateral and international development agencies;
- field visits to relevant business communities, libraries, universities and research communities.

## **4. Reporting**

The reports are mainly for sue by NORAD and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs as a tool to increase the quality and the effectiveness of the Norwegian development assistance to selected countries.

A draft report shall be presented NORAD for comments not later than two weeks after departure from the country to which NORAD shall submit comments within two weeks. A final report shall be presented to NORAD not later than two weeks after comments have been received from NORAD.

An oral presentation of the draft report shall be undertaken both to inform NORAD about the work process and to facilitate a discussion of the draft report to provide comments to the draft.

The report shall be written in English. NORAD shall receive 6 copies of the final report.



## **Annex 3:**

### **Terms of Reference: Country Report Angola 2000/2001, Part II**

#### **Background:**

NORAD, as well as other donors, has in recent years channelled a substantial part of its development aid to Angola through international NGOs. Local NGOs have so far mainly been partners in smaller projects or indirectly through international NGOs and UN agencies. The effectiveness of NGOs as development agents depends heavily on the environment and framework they are working in and their ability to co-ordinate between themselves, with the UN agencies and with governmental institutions on all levels.

The "Law on Associations" from 1991 at the present formally regulates NGO activities. For the last three years (approximately) a new law specific for NGOs has been under preparation. The Ministry of Social Affairs and Reintegration (MINARS) and NGOs have developed a participatory approach to the formulation of the law. Both the international and national NGOs umbrella organisations (CONGA and FONGA) have been involved and a working group with three representatives from each has been formed. The working group has regular contact with UTCAH, which is the responsible unit in MINARS.

#### **Scope of work:**

The report should analyse the legal, political and economic framework for NGOs working in Angola. Included in this the governmental policy towards national and international NGOs should be highlighted. Governmental institutions, national and international NGOs should be consulted to get their view on the environment for NGOs to act as effective and co-ordinated development agents under the present conditions and under the new law which is being elaborated. The specific co-ordination mechanisms in place should be evaluated and strengths and weaknesses discussed.

The Embassy will set up meetings with governmental institutions, UN agencies and national and international NGOs.

# Summary

This is the second report on Angola under the Country Advisor Agreement between the Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation (NORAD) and Chr. Michelsen Institute (CMI) and Nordic Consulting Group (NCG). The report consists of a Part I synthesising and assessing existing information regarding economic, political and social developments in Angola, and a Part II focusing on the role of national and international NGOs in the country. The number of NGOs has increased substantially since the introduction of the new democratic constitution in 1991. While they play an increasingly important role in emergency and development aid, they also occupy political space that is contested.